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Abstract 
 
The implosion of the 2008 financial crisis ignited fears that integration would 
transmit the crisis’ effects throughout the global system.  Examining two countries, 
Bangladesh and Zambia, this project shows that low-income countries with relatively 
little integration also saw negative impacts. This occurred through three main 
transmission mechanisms: trade flows, rising prices and financial flows that could have 
possible long-term effects at the macro and micro level. The manner and impact of each 
transmission mechanism, however, varied among LICs according to each country’s 
individual structural economic and financial vulnerabilities. Bangladesh saw a delayed 
impact but did not avoid the crisis completely, while Zambia saw a quick impact but 
recovered sooner. Where their individual cases converge, they offer recommendations for 
other LICs embarking on trade and financial liberalization in an interconnected but risky 
system. 
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CHAPTER ONE: A TRANSMISSION FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
The implosion of the 2008 financial crisis ignited fears that international trade and 
financial integration would transmit the crisis’ effects throughout the global system.  
How and to what extent continues to unfold.  Coined as “The Great Recession”, the 
breadth and depth of this crisis has been said to surpass any previous economic or 
financial crisis endured by the global system. Almost all countries suffered because of 
decreased economic growth but in varying depth and magnitude individually. For 
developed countries, financial integration became the primary transmission channel. 
Many of these countries were overleveraged with complex, high-risk financial products 
to the private sector and as a result, saw the largest declines in growth1.  
In contrast, the Great Recession had far less impact on low-income countries 
(LICs)2 than middle-income (MICs) or high-income countries (HICs) given their limited 
trade and financial integration. Nevertheless, international institutions3 raised red flags to 
the possible effects on LICs due to their structural political, economic and social 
constraints, including high poverty levels that impeded recovery options. While 
                                                 
1 Pelen Berkmen, et al, The Global Financial Crisis: Explaining Cross‐Country Differences in the Output Impact. The International 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper, WP/09/280 (2009): 14‐15.  
 
2 This project uses the following World Bank classifications from April 2011: low‐income: $995 GNI per capita or less, lower‐middle 
income, $996 ‐ $3,965; upper‐middle income, $3,966 ‐ $12,265; and high income, $12,266 or more. These were adjusted upward in 
later 2011 by $10 for each category using its Atlas methodology. For the purposes of this project and all data computation, the April 
2011 country groupings have been maintained. 
 
3 These institutions were mainly the IMF, United Nations and World Bank but also regional development institutions including the 
AfDB and ADB. 
2 
uninvolved with subprime mortgages or risky derivatives, they argued that the world’s 
poorest citizens would be especially vulnerable to the trade and financial transmission of 
the crisis along with rising food and fuel prices4. As a result of this triple combination, 
the World Bank (2010) estimated that 41 million more people would go undernourished 
in 2009, and 64 million more people would live under the $1.25 a day poverty line by 
20105. Moreover, it warned of the long-term consequences on development initiatives 
like the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
The World Bank (2009) conducted a study in early 2009 of 107 middle and low-
income developing countries to predict the level of vulnerability among countries and the 
possible development implications. They examined two main factors for each country: 
first, a demonstration of declining GDP growth6 and second, an initial high level of 
poverty7. Those countries that exhibited both characteristics were said to be highly 
exposed.  The results identified 43 countries in this category. Of those 43 countries, 23 
countries were LICs by definition, including both case study countries of this project, 
Bangladesh and Zambia.  
This work argued that the world’s poorest nations would be susceptible despite 
lower integration. However, it largely focused on how economic decisions and 
consequences in advanced countries would reach vulnerable countries as an entire group. 
This drew attention to the implications of the crisis in developed countries versus 
                                                 
4 Given this triple combination, it would be difficult to disaggregate the effects of the crisis alone.   
 
5 Sailesh Tiwari and Hassan Zaman, The Impact of Economic Shocks on Global Undernourishment. Policy Research Working Paper 
#5215, The World Bank, World Bank (2010): 2‐3. 
 
6 Defined as real per capita economic growth expected to be lower in 2008–09 compared to the studied period of 2004–2007. 
 
7 Defined by the country having had 20 percent or more of households below the $1.25 poverty line in 2005. 
3 
developing countries. It neither delved within or between low- and middle-income groups 
nor examined how unique economic and financial conditions could differentiate the depth 
and magnitude of the effects among LICs.  This was not done purposefully, but primarily 
because of a lack of and/or lagged data from these countries that prevented quality 
analysis at that time8. Additionally, LICs do share common characteristics that explain 
how they might collectively suffer the crisis.  
Nevertheless, the variances among LICs are important because they serve as 
reminders that poor countries do not have homogenous economic histories or policies. As 
a result, neither are their options for coping with or recovery from global macroeconomic 
shocks. With this in mind, this project examines how and why the Great Recession 
affected LICs, both similarly and differently. It begins by summarizing the three 
transmission mechanisms to LICs: trade flows, rising prices, and financial flows. Using 
development theory, it then reviews the interrelated structural vulnerabilities of many 
LICs that helped determine the severity of the transmission, including narrow exports that 
are low-cost and use little technology, and shallow financial systems.  
Chapters Two and Three use this framework to compare two cases: Bangladesh 
and Zambia9. Each case study analyzes the impacts of the transmission mechanisms and 
connects them to the country’s economic and financial structural vulnerabilities. It 
concludes with individual policy recommendations to address these weaknesses. These 
recommendations are not unknown but reemphasize the importance and challenge to 
overcome them. While some are country-specific, others are noteworthy for other LICs 
                                                 
8 This constraint remains today and is a general problem of research in LICs. 
 
9 Using the April 2011 World Bank categorization, both were LICs: Zambia at $970 GNI per capita and Bangladesh at $580 GNI per 
capita. 
4 
pursuing trade and financial liberalization, and these are summarized in Chapter Four 
with overall project conclusions.  
A Framework: Macroeconomic Transmission Mechanisms to LICs 
Beginning in late 200710, the subprime mortgage crisis caused firms and 
households to deleverage. This spread to financial markets worldwide, causing a rapid 
liquidation of assets, a decline in prices and a reduction in aggregate demand. The 
transmission to LICs then occurred through a decline in trade and financial flows and an 
increase in food and fuel prices. Trade flows refer to exports and imports. Financial flows 
include financial intermediation and public and private international capital including 
trade finance, foreign direct investment (FDI), official development assistance (ODA), 
and remittances. Domestic labor, financial and product markets then channeled these 
macroeconomic shocks to the household level, but this project does not deeply explore 
these impacts.  
Trade Mechanism 
First, the financial crisis was channeled to LICs through the trade mechanism, or 
the international flow of goods and services. As a result of a decline in aggregate 
demand, world trade fell by 11 percent in 2009 from 200811. This led to subsequent falls 
in production, employment, household income, purchasing power and government 
revenues.  World GDP contracted .57 percent from 2008 to 2009 and fell on average 5.9 
percent among all countries from 2007 to 200912. The effects were worse in high and 
                                                 
10 For the purposes of this project, the end of this crisis period is marked at the end 2010, when world trade and GDP growth again 
registered positive gains. 
 
11 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database (April 2010). 
 
12 Ibid. 
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middle-income countries in comparison to LICs, largely due to greater but riskier trade 
integration. Upper-middle income countries also fared worse than lower-middle income 
countries.  
 
Figure 1: GDP Growth Globally and by Income Group, as a percentage (2006‐2011)
Source: Constructed from the IMF, WEO Database (September 2011) with the country classifications of the World Bank, April 2011. 
For a list of countries used see Appendix A.  
 
 
Figure 1 shows the difference in average GDP growth between middle and low-
income groups during the crisis13. The results demonstrate that the poorest countries saw 
on average less economic impact than MICs. Export growth decelerated much sooner and 
further in MICs (Figure 2Error! Reference source not found.):  growth contracted -7 
percent and -5.6 percent in 2009 in upper- and lower-MICs, respectively, compared to 1.8 
percent and 3.4 percent the year before. LICs meanwhile maintained positive export 
growth, registering 8.5 percent in 2009 compared to 2.1 percent in 2008. LICs, however, 
saw a lag in the decline of aggregate demand and reported a slowdown in export growth 
in years 2009 and 2010 (10.8% both years) as sluggish demand continued. Growth in the 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that the differences among countries within these groups are stark, with volatile shifts in both export and 
import growth from year to year, and some countries hover between the two income groups. Thus, this should be used as an 
indication of the trend in flows between income groups. 
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6 
volume of imports also slowed considerably more in upper-MICs in 2009 (-10.4%) in 
comparison to lower-MICs (-3.4%) and LICs (-7.6%)14. 
Figure 2: Global Growth of Volume of Exports of Goods and Services, as a percentage (2006‐2011) 
 
Source: Constructed from the IMF, WEO Database (September 2011) with the country classifications of the World Bank, April 
2011. For a list of countries used see Appendix A.  
 
 
 
The transmission mechanism further spread to LICs by way of currency 
movements. The global meltdown spurred investors to liquidate their assets in many 
countries, causing currency depreciation. Low aggregate demand also led to downward 
pressures. Depreciation only caused investors to further transfer their portfolio allocations 
to appreciating currencies for a higher rate of return, causing further depreciation. Again, 
MICs with a higher amount of trade and financial flows saw greater volatility than LICs, 
but variances rose across LICs. For example, the Ethiopian birr depreciated almost 45 
percent15 from 2008 to 2010 against the US dollar while the Vietnamese dong saw almost 
18 percent depreciation against the US Dollar in the same period. In general, those 
countries with a flexible exchange rate system, including Vietnam, with a managed float 
                                                 
14 Calculated from IMF, WEO Database (September 2011); LICs have also seen a deeper decline in imports due to currency 
depreciation. 
 
15 Computed from the lowest value to the highest value in from Jan. 1, 2008‐Dec. 31, 2010 (Oanda.com). 
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7 
saw less volatility16. Currency depreciation can make other export sectors more attractive, 
but limited infrastructure, supply bottlenecks, and sustained lower global demand 
prevented many LICs from moving resources from one export sector to another to benefit 
from changes. Instead, LICs relied on international reserves from export revenues to 
stabilize their currencies and purchase more expensive imports.  
 
By early 2011, trade flows and GDP growth had rebounded (Figure 1) but 
continued to be below pre-crisis levels as sluggish and declining demand in advanced 
countries remained. The eruption of debt crises in many European countries also 
maintained fears. As a result, the IMF (WEO, October 2010) reported that imports by 
advanced economies would remain below pre-crisis trends for years to come with 
negative implications for emerging economies that depend upon export-led growth. This 
is particularly worrisome for LICs who rely on these flows to fuel growth, and for their 
governments that use export revenues from advanced countries to provide basic services. 
Despite this, the estimated growth rate of LICs is projected to be lower than for other 
countries (Figure 1), reflecting the economic constraints they face structurally that are 
exacerbated by lower aggregate demand.  
Rising Food and Fuel Prices 
Second, the financial crisis initially lessened consumer demand and reduced 
prices in many LICs. However, global food and fuel prices recovered in 2009 and have 
since been climbing steadily, reigniting inflation concerns. Global food prices hit a record 
                                                 
16 World Bank, The Great Recession and Developing Countries: Economic Impact and Growth Prospects. Edited by Mustapha K. Nabli. 
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank (2011): 36‐37. 
8 
high in February 2011, increasing 35 percent from the previous year17. As a result, the 
World Food Program (WFP) reported that for 44 of the 63 countries studied, price trends 
of the basic food basket had shifted upward more than 10 percent from the 5-year 
average18. In some of the poorest countries, the cost had increased over 100 percent and 
put many countries at high risk for food insecurity. 
Higher prices have been blamed on disparities between world supply and demand 
that have reduced food stocks and tightened markets. However, the financial crisis may 
have further contributed as a result of currency depreciation. A UNCTAD-endorsed study 
(Herrmann, 2009) found that currency depreciation from 2004-2008 has helped increases 
commodity prices in 39 of 168 countries, only one of which being a developed country. 
The study also cited price volatility due to increased speculation of commodity markets 
as investors moved out of the declining real estate and stock markets. Domestic policies 
that encourage food and oil stockpiles have also been charged. Coupled with the 
continual rise in the price of oil, long-run food inflation is expected.  
Rising prices affect countries differently depending upon domestic market 
structures and fiscal and monetary policies. They particularly harm countries that are net 
food and fuel importing countries (largely LICs) and further deteriorate their terms of 
trade. This occurs as import prices rise disproportionately to export prices, which are 
usually the cheaper primary commodities in LICs.  Lustig (2008) found that the recent 
food and fuel shocks deteriorated the terms of trade for 75 percent of 116 developing 
                                                 
17 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), FAO Food Price Index. 2011. http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs‐
home/foodpricesindex/en/ (accessed March 22 2011). 
 
18 World Food Program (WFP), "The Market Monitor: Trends of staple food prices in vulnerable countries" (April 2011). 
9 
countries. This led to inflationary pressures and strained governments as they attempted 
to mitigate the effects of rising prices.  
At the microeconomic level, most poor households are net consumers of staple 
food commodities and spend a larger proportion of their income (50-80 percent) on food 
items. Rising food prices then disproportionately hurt them. Rising fuel costs—a 
production input and transportation cost—also raised the price of many non-durable 
consumer goods purchased by them. While not explored, reported coping mechanisms 
included a reduction of nutrition, health services and education19 which have been 
disparately felt by women and children20.  In turn, this economic distress paired with 
higher under- and un-employment manifested into social and political unrest21. 
Financial Mechanism 
Last, the crisis moved to LICs through the financial mechanism, despite 
arguments they would be insulated by their shallow financial systems22. Even without 
deep linkages, the past decade had seen a large increase in the amount of foreign actors 
and inflows to LICs; illustratively inflows of FDI increased 1,257 percent from 2000-
2008 to LICs23. Integration provided critical capital resources but also created a conduit 
through which global financial movements were transmitted (Stiglitz, 2010). The areas of 
greatest impact in LICs were asset quality, lending including trade finance, portfolio 
                                                 
19 For more on coping mechanisms, see Henk‐Jan Brinkman, et al, "High Food Prices and the Global Financial Crisis Have Reduced 
Access to Nutritious Food and Worsened Nutritional Status and Health." The Journal of Nutrition 140, no. 1 (January 2010): 154‐161.  
 
20 Studies show this is disparate given the fact that women and children comprised 70 percent of the world’s hungry in 2007 (Rania 
Antonopoulos, “The Current Economic and Financial Crisis: A Gender Perspective.” Working Paper No. 562, Bureau for Development 
Policy, Gender Team, United Nations Development Program (May 2009): 26). 
 
21 For example, higher prices have resulted in recent food riots in many developing countries. 
 
22 For this project, a shallow financial system refers to a lack of or limited money and capital markets. Banking is usually centralized 
and offers few financial products. Stock and bond markets are limited or nonexistent, also limiting financial products. Additionally, 
the government tends to remain the primary borrower with less participation from the private sector.  
 
23 Computed from UNCTAD, UNCTADstat Database (2011) 
10 
investment and FDI. ODA, remittances, and international loans, while important, are 
explored briefly24. 
In the banking sector, LICs felt the effects primarily through decreased asset 
quality, global liquidity and access to credit. The number of non-performing loans 
(NPLs) in many LICs increased as borrowers, facing income reductions, defaulted. 
International bank lending also declined in some LICs as the reduction in liquidity 
trickled down from the foreign parent bank to the domestic subsidiary bank. Additionally, 
the global credit crunch forced up interest rates, as the supply of credit in formal 
institutions fell. This reduced lending largely to the private sector.  Other non-bank 
financial institutions in LICs, including microfinance institutions that serve many of the 
unbanked in LICs, also reported a reduction in financial lending25.  Impact and recovery 
varied, determined by its ownership, initial capitalization and regulatory system. 
There is also some evidence that banks and private companies reduced sources of 
trade finance, including letters of credit (from banks) and trade credit (between buyers 
and sellers). This harmed producers in LICs who use these tools to smooth the bumps 
between the time and placement of the order. One estimate argued that because of the 
financial crisis, the reduction in trade finance to developing countries could create a $25 
billion gap in supply and demand to producers worldwide (Aubion, 2009). The results, 
though, have been largely anecdotal and more concentrated in Latin America and the 
Caribbean26. This is not to say other LICs in other parts of the world have not been 
                                                 
24 They are not explored in detail partially because did not see large shifts but were largely resilient.  
 
25 Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), "The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Microfinance Institutions and Their Clients: 
Results from CGAP's 2009 Opinion Survey." 2009. Results from CGAP’s 2009 Opinion Survey. 2009.   
 
26 John Humphrey, "Trade financing: Is it a barrier to Africa's exports?" VOX. April 28, 2009. 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3507 (accessed August 20 , 2011). 
11 
affected: letters of credit from foreign banks to Bangladesh have been reduced in 
response to lower export growth in their own countries27.  Decreases in trade credit have 
also been reported in Africa, but primarily in West Africa28. Instead, reports in LICs have 
centered on lower global and domestic credit access in general.  
 The global decline also caused reductions in FDI and portfolio investment. FDI 
fell almost 40 percent globally from 2008 to 200929. As a percentage of GDP, the amount 
of FDI to MICs (13.2%) was more than double than the amount to LICs (6.5%) in 200830. 
However, net FDI fell only slightly more in MICs in 2009 (22.9%) than in LICs 
(21.6%)31. While LICs had fewer inflows to begin, capital flight may have been 
comparable as investors moved their assets to perceived safer havens, i.e. MICs. Portfolio 
investment also fell in many LICs, but again deeper in countries in which it had a larger 
stake to begin with32. The effect of these declines varies, but ideally, these flows would 
supply critical capital to encourage production, create jobs, increase incomes and reduce 
poverty. In reality, the results are mixed, as the potential benefits depend on the initial 
institutions and development in the host country to capture any spillover effects33. 
Nevertheless, the decline increased pressures on governments and domestic financial 
systems in LICs as import duties and tax revenues also dried up.  
                                                 
27 "Indian banks discourage importing Bangladeshi goods," Weekly Blitz. September 12, 2011. 
http://www.weeklyblitz.net/1792/indian‐banks‐discourage‐importing‐bangladeshi (accessed September 29, 2011). 
 
28 John Humphrey, "Are Exporters in Africa Facing Reduced Availability of Trade Finance." Institute of Development Studies, 
Brighton, UK, March 2009. 
 
29 This was a drop from $593 billion to $359 billion (World Bank, World dataBank (2011)).  
 
30 UNCTAD, UNCTADstat Database (2011). 
 
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Illustratively, in a World Bank study of several developing countries, India, China and Poland and Turkey had large stock market 
gains that saw significant outflows in comparison to the Philippines, Malaysia and Ethiopia that had smaller stock market 
capitalization increases before the crisis  (World Bank, The Great Recession and Developing Countries (2011): 23). 
33 For a research and discussion on this, see Dabla‐Norris, et al (2010) and Kozul‐Wright and Rowthorn (1998).  
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The financial crisis also moved to LICs through changes in ODA. Like FDI, ODA 
is a critical source of government revenue for many LICs. Thus, any decline in the 
volume of ODA threatened government expenditures on important programs and services 
often directed at vulnerable groups. The results show ODA fell globally from 128 billion 
in 2008 to 120 billion (6.25%) in 2009 but not as steep as predicted34. In fact, some LICs 
saw aid amounts increase in response to the financial and food crises35. However, in 
many cases, foreign aid funding from advanced countries was not as prioritized as 
domestic pressures require greater attention, and financial commitments did not increase 
at the rate needed36.  
Last, experts debated the possible implications of a decline in remittances from 
the Great Recession, as they account for over $400 billion and are closely tied to 
household spending on human development37. In theory, a decline in migrants’ income 
due to depressed global demand and output should reduce remittance flows. One study 
estimated that remittances could fall 3-7 percent in the majority of African countries, the 
continent with the highest number of LICs38. To date, remittances to LICs were more 
resilient than other types of financial flows; both case studies recorded positive growth 
but at a slower rate. This is attributed to the fact that most LICs do not have large 
                                                 
34 Some predicted the results from the Great Recession would be similar to or deeper than past crises where ODA has fallen 20‐25% 
(Dang, et al (2009)). 
 
35 Ethiopia for example, saw its aid flows increase 21 percent in 2010 (World Bank, The Great Recession and Developing Countries, 
2011: 219).  
 
36 Helene Cooper. "Economic Crisis Sidelines Fate of the World's Poorest." The New York Times. November 11, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/world/11aid.html?_r=1&emc=eta1 (accessed December 2010, 15).  
For example, in October 2010 donor countries pledged $11.7 billion to the Global Fund to fight HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria for 2011‐2013 but this was under the projected $17‐20 billion needed to fight these diseases (See Doughton (2010)).  
 
37 World Bank, The Great Recession and Developing Countries (2011): 28. 
 
38 Adolfo Barajas, et al, "The Global Financial Crisis and Workers' Remittances to Africa: What's the Damage?" WP/10/24, 
International Monetary Fund, January 2010. 
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numbers of migrants in developed countries, where the crisis hit hardest, and remittances 
have been found to be highly correlated to factors outside of income levels39.  
A Framework: Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability 
Questions quickly arise as to why these channels functioned the way in which 
they did, and how they differed among LICs. The answers link to each country’s initial 
structural economic and financial vulnerabilities.  This section discusses some of the key, 
interrelated weaknesses that characterize many LICs, including Bangladesh and Zambia: 
narrow exports that are low-valued and use little technology, and shallow financial 
systems. Interwoven into the case studies, these vulnerabilities help explain how each 
LIC became more susceptible to the crisis, understand the variances that arose among 
LICs, and highlight the areas in which development challenges remain. 
To begin, many LICs have a narrow export concentration with limited 
connections to other parts of the economy. Ricardo (1817) argued for trade according to a 
country’s comparative advantage, determined by differences in productivity of labor that 
made international trade necessary. The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model later40 argued that 
each nation would export the commodity that more intensely used its abundant, cheaper 
factor (capital or labor). Assuming perfect factor mobility, its corollary argued factor-
price equalization through trade (Samuelson, 1948). However, it soon became evident 
that many LICs only held a comparative advantage in low-priced, labor-intensive primary 
                                                 
39 For a discussion on some of the determinants of remittances, see Ilene Grabel, "The Political Economy of Remitttances: What Do 
We Know? What do we Need to Know?" Political Economic Research Institute Working Paper No. 184 (October 2008). 
 
40 The H‐0 model extended the classical trade model beyond just labor productivity to explore the other reasons for varying 
productivity and comparative advantage, and how trade affects factor earnings among countries (For more of a discussion, see 
Dominick Salvatore,  International Economics. 8th Edition. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004 (115‐136)). 
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commodities, and the return on capital and wage rates would not converge41. This reality 
results from factors including but not limited to: colonial history, geographic luck, 
political instability and social patterns that all influence and limit economic decisions and 
conditions in a country. Given these other variables, LICs do not have the same amount 
of technology, discussed below, or face the same trade barriers and/or factor constraints 
as other higher-income countries. Instead, growth in LICs often becomes concentrated 
rather than balanced—or spread out—among several industries.  
While often unavoidable, export concentration in one sector carries long-term 
consequences. As Nurkse (1957) argued, concentration in a single industry, i.e. 
agriculture, makes it more difficult or impossible for the price mechanism and small 
market alone to create mutually supporting industries that improve productivity within 
sectors. Without resources cultivated in other sectors, the ability to increase aggregate 
output, income, purchasing power and the standard of living are limited. Instead, Nurkse 
(1957) argued for balanced growth with induced investment in several industries as, “first 
and foremost a means of getting out of a rut, a means of stepping up the rate of growth 
when the external forces of advance through trade expansion and foreign capital are 
sluggish or inoperative” (p. 248). 
However, balanced growth is often unfeasible given inadequate resources and 
capacity. Noting this, Hirschman (1958) later argued that development is a process, 
without starting and stopping points, and with continual disequilibria. As a result, 
balanced growth in all industries would not be required so as the imbalances, or 
                                                 
41 Ibid. Using the two‐factor model, international trade has not led to equal returns on homogeneous factors in different nations. 
Moreover, the Leontief Paradox found that countries do not always export the commodity in which they have factor intensity, given 
other variables.   
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destabilization, created the proper connections within and between sectors. He argued for 
both “backward and forward linkages” that utilized complementary effects42 to encourage 
export diversification into higher-value added manufacturing and to increase net wealth. 
A backward linkage would be created as one sector provided inputs required by another 
to make the current product while a forward linkage would emerge when the current 
finished product was used (or became an input) in another sector. Critically, by nature, 
industrialization would give way to more linkage opportunities. 
Disequilibria that induced these types of linkages, however, would not occur from 
economic forces alone but required deliberate actions by external actors to serve as an 
impetus to an investment series. This investment would also require improved technology 
and training. The early H-O model assumed all firms were on a common production 
function that used the same technology (same access), that factor price ratios determined 
technological processes, and that new processes transferred easily from among countries 
and firms43. Later, endogenous growth models argued that technological change is 
actually endogenous, determined by country-specific variables44. Moreover, the evidence 
demonstrated that those countries and regions with a technology-intensive specialization 
yielded higher spillovers—or positive externalities—to other industries and as a result, 
developed quicker. Again, this was higher in industrial processes and did not occur 
automatically. 
                                                 
42 Complementary effects emerge as the demand for one commodity and the subsequent increase in its output calls for an increased 
demand for another commodity (Hirschman (1958): 68).   
 
43 For a further discussion, see R.R. Nelson and S.J. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1982) and Salvatore (2004). 
 
44 For example, see Paul M. Romer, "The Origins of Endogenous Growth." Journal of Economic Perspectives 8 (Winter): 3‐22. 
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Instead, in order for technology to be captured and adapted in developing 
countries, targeted efforts at both the firm and national levels were needed. These efforts 
would need to overcome market failures and to increase knowledge by leveraging current 
financial and human capital resources to create incentives in certain sectors to make 
technology worthwhile, to increase the capabilities of the sector to absorb the technology, 
and to develop technological effort to go out and acquire the technology (Lall, 1992). 
Summarizing Lall (1992) wrote, 
“It is the interplay of all these factors…that determines at the firm level how well 
producers learn the skills and master the information needed to cope with 
industrial technology and, at the national level, how well countries employ their 
factor endowments, raise those endowments over time, and grow dynamically in 
the context of rapidly changing technologies” (p. 180-181).    
Unfortunately, the actors and actions needed to acquire and/or adapt the technology to 
create the spillovers are non-existent or too weak in LICs, leaving them few growth 
opportunities.  
With little opportunity for diversification, LICs remain dependent on low-priced 
exports that are vulnerable to deteriorating terms of trade. As Prebisch (1950, 1959) and 
Singer (1950) argued, the “periphery”–the majority of which is LICs—produce primary 
commodities and minerals based on comparative advantage. However, these goods 
undergo more volatile price changes than other goods that often make them a price taker. 
Known as the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, this makes them vulnerable to global 
fluctuations and low export demand. This deteriorates their terms of trade over time as 
the price of exports declines while the price of imports (a large portion being 
manufactured goods) rises. Thus, in order for the periphery to receive the same amount of 
now more expensive imports, it must produce and export more lower-priced 
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commodities. This becomes more challenging as consumers in advanced countries, 
earning a higher income, substitute higher-valued products for lower-valued, primary 
products. 
The hypothesis further argues that this phenomenon works against LICs as they 
face higher prices of capital-intensive imports needed for expansion and diversification. 
In recent years, this argument has been extended to low-end manufactures, including low-
end garments (UNTCAD, 2002). Both case study countries demonstrated this struggle: 
both saw their terms of trade deteriorate as the value of imports rose faster than that of 
exports. As a result, they struggled to afford capital-intensive imports needed for 
economic growth and instead amassed debt. To counteract this trend, Prebisch and Singer 
recommended LICs initiate a process of directed import substitution industrialization 
along with export diversification to reduce dependency. In many LICs, including 
Bangladesh and Zambia, this was largely not done, making them more vulnerable and 
less competitive.  
The above problems are compounded and caused in part by shallow financial 
systems including a lack of monetary resources to effectively raise and utilize capital. 
Most LICs have little or no formal banking institutions and limited financial products. 
Most lack or have limited stock and bond markets that constrain financial flows, and the 
government remains the largest borrower in many LICs. Early economists quickly 
noticed the problems that arise from a lack of capital resources and systems: Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943) concluded from his study of underdeveloped areas that the absence of this 
outside “push” to train large, unskilled labor forces and adopt new research and 
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technology slows the process of industrialization. Market forces alone leave little 
incentive for investment, as it remains unprofitable.  
In a similar manner, Nurkse (1961) later wrote on the struggle for capital 
formation in underdeveloped countries, “a country is poor because it is poor…” with a 
cyclical relationship that “afflicts the accumulation of capital in economically backward 
countries” (p. 4-5). He explained that the supply of capital is limited by low savings and a 
small market. A lack of capital decreases productivity, further reducing incomes and 
savings. On the demand side, low capital results from low induced investment, low 
purchasing power, and low incomes which result from low productivity and low capital 
to begin with. The low level of income from low productivity is common to both. 
Without enough economic push and with high poverty characterized by low incomes, 
LICs then find it difficult to mobilize investment to increase productivity. Instead, they 
become trapped in Nurkse’s “vicious cycle” of underdevelopment.   
Moreover, in trying to attract additional financial resources, LICs often reduce 
adequate controls of financial products and foreign participation and investment. In the 
short-run, this encourages unregulated, riskier international financial flows that can cause 
currency appreciation with inflows and capital flight with outflows, seen again during the 
crisis. In the long-run, the benefits of foreign flows may not be captured without the 
capacity of its institutions needed (Hermes and Lensink, 2004). Instead, the associated 
costs, i.e. environmental degradation and income inequality, will outweigh the benefits, 
causing further economic vulnerability.  
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Selection of Zambia and Bangladesh 
With this understanding, two cases are examined: Bangladesh and Zambia. Both 
LICs were at high risk to the financial crisis through the traditional channels. In both 
cases, trade flows were the primary transmission mechanism, while the financial 
mechanism had less impact. Additionally, in both cases, the manner and depth of the 
transmission mechanisms linked to each country’s economic and financial vulnerabilities.  
Prior to the Great Recession, both countries had emerged from colonialism and 
adopted then-popular paths of development: nationalization of industries that maintained 
heavy state control of key industries. Both countries began to pursue slowly an export-
promotion strategy but economic development remained weak due to many of the reasons 
discussed above, encouraging export concentration (more than 70% of revenues from one 
source). By the 1980s, international and domestic pressures encouraged neoliberal 
prescriptions that led to trade liberalization. Financial liberalization also increased but 
remained limited as private and foreign investment remained small. Politically, both 
countries moved toward democratic governments in the early 1990s and saw increased 
financial flows, economic growth, decreased poverty45, and human development. 
Nevertheless, they maintained old and created new challenges.   
Bangladesh and Zambia also demonstrated key differences at the outset, besides 
location. Zambia’s rich geography encouraged dependency on extractive minerals—
copper and cobalt—that routinely underwent volatile price changes. In contrast, 
Bangladesh’s low-cost labor fostered its reliance on labor-intensive garments. Trade 
direction also varied and as a percentage of GDP, Zambia was more open than 
                                                 
45 Poverty in Zambia is roughly 59.3 percent while poverty in Bangladesh is roughly 40 percent according to national poverty lines 
(World Bank, World dataBank (2011)). 
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Bangladesh46. In 2007, both had increasing trade volumes but Zambia continued to have 
a trade deficit47. In the financial sector, Zambia had higher levels of foreign involvement 
in its money and capital markets, with larger amounts of FDI and foreign portfolio 
investment to GDP than Bangladesh48. In Bangladesh, the state and domestic actors had a 
higher level of involvement in both sectors49. Remittances also were higher in 
Bangladesh50. Zambia received more ODA but also a higher poverty level, plagued by 
HIV/AIDs51.  
As will be explored, these factors and others defined their development paths 
early on, creating shared and unique economic and financial vulnerabilities. These 
established the trajectory of their individual experiences, and presented particular 
challenges for their future growth. To the degree in which their experiences converge, 
they offer lessons for other LICs seeking economic and human development as part of an 
interconnected but risky global system.  
 
 
                                                 
46 In 2007, Zambia registered 75.6 percent trade openness while Bangladesh was 43.4 percent, measured as X+M as a % of GDP (IMF, 
WEO Database (September 2011)). 
 
47 In 2007, current balance of payments was $‐0.754 billion for Zambia while $0.829 billion for Bangladesh (IMF, WEO Database 
(September 2011)).  
 
48 As a percentage of GDP in 2007, FDI: .9 percent for Bangladesh while 11 percent for Zambia; PI, excluding LCFAR=.5 percent for 
Zambia while .2 percent for Bangladesh. Market capitalization of listed companies was 9.9% in Bangladesh while 20% in Zambia 
(World Bank, World dataBank (2011); UNTCAD, UNCTADstat Database (2011)).  
 
49 While the banking sector is much larger in Bangladesh, the majority of banks are run by domestic actors; only 7 percent of assets 
are held by foreign banks versus 64.2 percent in Zambia (World Bank, World dataBank (2011)). 
Domestic credit by the banking sector was then (% of GDP) in 2007: 58.21% in Bangladesh versus 16.3% in Zambia. Domestic credit 
to the private sector (% of GDP): 37.28% in Bangladesh versus 11.8% in Zambia (World Bank, World dataBank (2011)).  
 
50 Remittances in Bangladesh were 9.5 percent to GDP versus .5 to GDP in Zambia in 2007 (World Bank, Migration and Remittances 
Factbook 2011 (2011)). 
 
51 ODA to GDP was 2.3 percent in Bangladesh while 9.7 percent in Zambia in 2007 (UNTCAD, UNCTADstat Database (2011)).  
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CHAPTER TWO: BANGLADESH CASE STUDY  
Delayed Impact but Slow Recovery  
At the onset of the global financial crisis, development experts estimated the 
possible impacts to the South Asian country of Bangladesh. The World Bank (2009) 
study of the previous chapter categorized it as highly exposed to the effects of the 
financial crisis. This came from its initial high level of poverty (40%) and estimates that 
GDP would fall 2-3 percent annually52. As will be shown, these concerns were rooted in 
the country’s economic and financial features coupled with rising global prices and 
competition. In fact, Bangladesh did not suffer as expected but also did not completely 
avert the crisis. Instead, the crisis further exposed the underlying vulnerabilities of the 
country’s trade and financial sectors.  
This chapter develops these conclusions in the following format: first, it 
demonstrates how the trade transmission transferred the crisis to Bangladesh with 
subsequent effects on exports and imports and as a result, its currency, unemployment, 
and government revenues. The effects of the trade transmission are then linked to 
Bangladesh’s initial structural vulnerabilities. It then looks at how the financial 
mechanism affected the LIC and connects the mechanism to its shallow financial system. 
                                                 
52 Mustafizur Rahman, et al, Paper1: Bangladesh. Global Financial Crisis Discussion Series, London: Overseas Development Institute 
(May 2009): 2‐3. 
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It concludes with economic and policy recommendations for the country to address these 
weaknesses amidst rising competition and slow growth.  
The Great Recession and its Trade Transmission (2008-2010) 
By 2008, Bangladesh’s economy was booming: it had registered its highest GDP 
growth rate ever at 6.5 percent (Figure 3), and its trade openness had reached 43.4 
percent53. Its economic structure consisted of 30 percent industrial goods, including 
garments and textiles, 20 percent agriculture and 50 percent services. Exports amounted 
for roughly one-tenth of GDP but the large majority (85%) went to advanced countries 
including the United States and in the European Union (EU). Exported goods included 
textiles and apparels, leather, footwear, jute and jute products, but the multi-billion dollar 
ready-made garment (RMG) industry alone comprised 75 percent of export revenues and 
averaged 15 percent annual growth54. Imports included capital machinery and equipment, 
textiles and RMG inputs, food, chemicals, crude oil, and petroleum.  
Ready-made garments include woven and knitwear products. Woven products 
include t-shirts, shirts and trousers. Knitwear products entail socks, stockings, 
undergarments and soft garments like t-shirts and sweaters. In 2008, there were over 
4,000 RMG firms in the country, serving as one of the largest employers and the largest 
source of foreign exchange earnings55. The majority of firms were locally but privately-
owned. The industry by nature is low-cost and labor-intensive, utilizing economies of 
                                                 
53 Defined as exports + imports as percentage of GDP (Calculated from IMF, WEO Database (October 2010)).  
 
54 Mohammed Ziau Haider, "Competitiveness of the Bangladesh Ready‐made Garment Industry in Major International Markets." 
Asia‐Pacific Trade and Investment Review 3, no. 1 (June 2007): 6. 
 
55 Ibid, p. 7 
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scale for large production. This is a comparative advantage for Bangladesh, which has an 
extremely cheap but low-skilled population of 162 million people.  
Figure 3: Bangladesh GDP growth, constant prices as a 
percentage (1995‐2011) 
Figure 4: Bangladesh Growth of Volume of Exports and 
Imports, as a percentage (2006‐2012) 
Source: Constructed from the IMF, WEO Database (October 2010). Estimates begin after 2008. 
 
Given its high integration with Western markets and little export diversification, 
the evidence shows that the greatest impacts to the LIC from the recession were in the 
areas of exports and imports with accompanying effects in the labor market and 
government revenues,  but were not to the large extent predicted. 
In looking at exports, Bangladesh’s economy remained robust at first because of 
its narrow concentration in both types of products and numbers of buyers. The RMG 
industry continued to drive growth and upheld export revenues until the first quarter of 
FY2009, registering 12.7 percent growth56 (Figure 5). While non-RMG export57 growth 
fell, total export growth remained positive due to the RMG industry. This was possible 
due to preplaced agreements with giant retailers. Given the lead-time required to get 
garments, large retailers often negotiate orders at a certain price per unit well in advance. 
                                                 
56 The Bangladesh fiscal year runs from June‐July. 
 
57 This consists largely of jute and jute products, frozen seafood and leather. 
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Based on its cheap labor, this allowed Bangladesh to keep producing garments to fill 
these orders. Additionally, its RMG exports have a low but positive income elasticity of 
demand. The so-called Wal-Mart effect, consumers with higher incomes substituted 
higher-priced goods with cheaper goods, i.e. garments while consumers with lower 
incomes maintained their demand of lower-priced goods, i.e. garments. This gave 
producers and the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) more export revenues to rely upon58 
and time to prepare. 
It was not until September 2009, almost a year after the crisis hit the rest of the 
world, that Bangladesh registered negative growth in total exports. The eventual impact 
was also a result of its narrow export composition and direction: over 80 percent of its 
RMG exports went to advanced countries where the crisis originated, servicing large 
clothing retailers like Wal-Mart and Old Navy in the United States, Canada and the EU. 
As a result, declining wealth and income in these advanced countries eventually reduced 
demand for Bangladeshi garment exports. When preplaced orders were filled, inventories 
were depleted, garment demand then declined and production finally fell. As a result, the 
rate of growth in RMG exports alone fell 28.6 percent from the first nine months of 2009 
compared to the same period the year before (Figure 2.3). Given its large share, this 
reduced the potential for overall export growth, and it rose only slightly: 16.65 percent in 
2010 from 16.55 percent in 2009. This was a sharp reversal from an impressive 11.3 
percent gain in the rate of export growth in 2008 (Figure 4).  
                                                 
58 Without its high dependence on the RMG industry that secured reserves, it may not have fared as well as its other sectors saw an 
automatic response to declines in global demand.     
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Figure 5: Bangladesh’s Quarterly Export Growth, as a percentage (July 2008‐Sept. 2009) 
 
Source: Constructed from Bangladesh Export Promotion Bureau. Export Statistics Database  (2011) 
 
Despite a change in exports, Bangladesh saw less volatility its exchange rate in 
comparison to other LICs, including Zambia. This is because the Bangladesh Bank (BB) 
stabilized the Bangladeshi taka against the dollar by buying or selling dollars when 
needed, using its large pool of stored reserves. Illustratively, the amount of international 
reserves increased by only $363 million in 2010 compared to a $4,530 million increase in 
200959. Using reserves, the taka then appreciated only 1.3 percent against the US dollar 
from its highest to its lowest value from September 2008 to September 200960. However, 
the weakening of the dollar during this period against other major currencies led to a 
depreciation of the taka against these same currencies; the taka depreciated 1.01 percent 
against the euro and 8.9 percent against the rupee61. 
Looking at the labor market, it can be seen that Bangladesh’s historical reliance 
on its labor-intensive, low-valued exports helped weaken the initial impact of the crisis. 
Most factories continued production, making a profit off the quantity sold rather than the 
                                                 
59 Computed from UNTCAD, UNCTADStat Database (2011).  
 
60 From the highest value during the year (week of September 22‐28, 2008) to the lowest value to the US dollar (week of April 6‐12, 
2009); computed from Oanda. Historical Exchange Rates. 2011. http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical‐rates/ (accessed July 20, 
2011). 
 
61 Ibid. 
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price of garments sold. As a result, the unemployment rate rose just .1 percent to 3.7 
percent in FY2009/1062 from the year before. This was a relief as the sector employs over 
2.5 million people, 90 percent of which are women and who represent some of the 
poorest people63. However, while a large amount of people, this is still small in relation to 
the entire population. Nevertheless, the labor market did not go entirely unaffected: over 
30,000 garment workers were reported to have lost their jobs in the first nine months of 
the 2009 with other undocumented losses in the informal labor market64.  
Additionally, employment may have remained stable as producers utilized other 
cost-cutting methods. This follows a UNTCAD study (2002) that found that low-
technological, labor-intensive manufacturing industries in LICs are more able to repress 
wages by relying on low-skilled workers. In Bangladesh, the recession brought reports of 
factories reducing benefits, hours, overtime, and underutilizing production capacity, all of 
which reduced take-home wages, delayed new hires and reduced workers’ productivity. 
Child labor has also been reportedly increased65. These tactics raised human rights 
concerns and labor riots66. There has been no evidence that this trend has reversed, and 
estimates predict the labor supply will continue to outmatch job creation in upcoming 
                                                 
62 Mustafizur Rahman, et al, Paper 12: Bangladesh Phase 2. Global Financial Crisis Discussion Series, London: Overseas Development 
Institute (January 2010): 17.  
 
63 Khan Murshid, et al, The Global Financial Crisis Implications for Bangladesh. BIDS‐PRP Working Paper Series #1, The Bangladesh 
Institute of Development Studies, (April 2009): 15. 
 
64 Rahman, et al, (2010 ): 17. See also Murshid (April 2009).  
 
65 Tom Ramstack, "Child labor common during economic recession, Labor Department says." All Headline News. October 7, 2011. 
http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/90062129?Child%20labor%20common%20during%20economic%20recession%2C%20Lab
or%20Department%20says (accessed October 8, 2011). 
 
66 For example, over 15,000 garment workers took to the streets in July 2010 to protest low and unpaid wages and poor working 
conditions; See Jason Burke and Saad Hammadi, "Dhaka garment workers in violent protests over low pay." The Guardian 
Newspaper Online. July 30, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/30/dhaka‐garment‐workers‐violent‐protests (accessed 
May 20, 2011). 
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years67.  As investors and buyers become more stringent about labor rights and 
productivity, this could reduce future garment orders.  
Still another impact of the transmission, imports declined with exports68. 
Sustained RMG production first kept import growth strong in the first quarter of 
FY2008/09. However, imports fell with exports and registered -19 percent growth at their 
lowest point (Figure 6). Import growth was only then 9.6 percent in 2010, compared to 21 
percent in 200969. Capital machinery, textiles and RMG inputs saw the greatest declines 
in growth as production of RMG exports fell. Food imports also fell due to higher global 
food and petroleum prices. A stronger agricultural sector also increased local 
production70 and helped offset more expensive imports and rising food inflation71. This 
likely supported poor families that saw purchasing power fall.   
Figure 6: Bangladesh’s Quarterly Import Growth, as a percentage (July 2008‐Sept. 2009) 
Source: Constructed from data collected from the Bangladesh Bank as reported in Rahaman et al, (2010): 12. 
 
 
                                                 
67 Rahman, et al, (2010): 17.  
 
68 Main imports being capital machinery and equipment, textiles and RMG inputs, food, chemicals, crude oil and petroleum. 
 
69 IMF, WEO Database (September 2011). 
 
70 This was encouraged by government programs and an additional stimulus package that provided subsidies to farmers (Rahman, et 
al, (2010): 20‐23).  
 
71 Food inflation hit 14.36 percent in April 2011, compared with a 13.87 percent in March, driven by rice, wheat, sugar and edible oil 
global price increases; (“Bangladesh inflation quickens on food price surges." Reuters. May 24, 2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/24/bangladesh‐economy‐inflation‐idUSL3E7GO0V320110524 (accessed July 20, 2011)). 
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In the short-term, the import decline had a two-fold effect on the Bangladeshi 
economy. On the one hand, it improved its balance of payments (BoP) situation. A 
simultaneous decline in reserves for import payments with declining export revenues 
could have further deteriorated its trade position. On the other hand, the reduction in the 
volume of imports resulted in a reduction of import duties by 2.6 percent from 2008 to 
200972. Value-added tax and supplementary duties also fell. These revenues were 
especially critical as they accounted for roughly 30 percent of the total domestic revenue 
of the national budget73. Coupled with declines in foreign investment, ODA, and lower 
export revenues, the trade transmission then presented fiscal challenges to the GoB as 
expenditures continued to rise. As a result, government borrowing also rose (Figure 7). 
 Figure 7: GoB Revenues, Expenditures and Borrowing/Lending, as a percentage of GDP (2000‐2012) 
Source: Constructed from IMF, WEO Database (September 2010). Estimates begin after 2008.
 
                                                 
72 Rahman, et al, (2010): 13. 
 
73 Ibid, as of 2009/2010. 
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Figure 8: Bangladesh’s Current Account Balance, in US Billions (2006‐2012)
 
Source: Constructed from IMF, WEO Database (September 2011). Estimates begin after 2010.
 
Thus, it is clear the trade transmission had several economic impacts on 
Bangladesh. The impacts were delayed, but a decline in global aggregate demand 
eventually caused exports and imports to decline. This deteriorated the LIC’s BoP from 
$3.3 billion in 2009 to $2.3 billion in 2010, or 24.5 percent (Figure 8). This occurred as 
imports (largely of RMG inputs) fell while export growth remained stagnant. The trade 
transmission had subsequent negative effects on unemployment and underemployment, 
and government revenues. These could have long-term impacts at the micro level. The 
impact of the transmission linked to Bangladesh’s structural vulnerabilities: high export 
concentration that relied on labor-intensive, low technological processes that resulted 
from economic decisions and conditions leading up to the crisis. This is explored below 
in two periods: independence to the early 198574 and 1985 to the crisis in 2008.   
Trade Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability 
First Period (1971-1985) 
In this first period, Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation in 1971 from 
Pakistan following a civil war that left the country and its citizens destitute. Formerly 
                                                 
74 This year was chosen as it is when Bangladesh saw quota allowances reduced significantly.  As a result, its competitive advantage 
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East Pakistan, the Pakistani government largely had ignored the region. Agriculture 
served as the region’s primary industry by utilizing its fertile soil and ample water 
supply. The jute industry was the country’s largest industry, exporter and employer. 
However, the sector relied heavily on traditional agricultural methods and low world 
prices. The textile industry, while not as large, had been developed under the previous 
colonization period75 using the region’s water supply and abundant labor force for 
chemical processing and assembling. However, it had fallen by the wayside due to a lack 
of public or private investment to make critical upgrades. 
At independence, the new government nationalized all large textile mills from 
previous Pakistani owners to take back control of the industry. The GoB organized the 
factories under the Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation (BTMC) and subsidized the 
upgrade of and imports needed for textile mills. The real growth catalyst however was 
preferential international trade agreements. The establishment of the international Multi-
Fiber Agreement (MFA)76 in 1974 limited the amount of exported garments and other 
textiles to certain developed countries. The agreement allotted poor countries larger quota 
amounts. This allowed most Bangladeshi garment exports to enter the EU and USA duty-
free, and its abundant cheap labor offered its buyers low prices. This encouraged 
investment and growth in the RMG industry, as the imposition of quotas incentivized 
international buyers and investors to shift their demand. By the decade’s end, monetary 
and labor resources had moved further away from the agricultural sector, and RMG had 
quickly replaced jute as the primary export industry.  
                                                 
75 East Bengal was part of Pakistan that was formerly part of India, colonized by the British. 
 
76 Signed in 1974, the MFA set quotas on the amount of garments and textiles developing countries, with a low‐labor cost 
advantage, could export to developed countries. It expired in 2005.  
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Critical observations from this early period largely underscore the creation of 
Bangladesh’s dependence on one export source with few opportunities for export 
diversification. Notably, it is unlikely the textile industry would have grown without this 
protection period. The government’s early role in the industry provided the institutional 
impetus, but favorable quota restrictions gave its exports the economic advantage needed 
to compete internationally. Referenced in Chapter One, protection policies—including 
quota restrictions—in LICs can help them overcome economic barriers that perpetuate 
underdevelopment including narrow, low-value, low-tech exports that often give way to 
deteriorating terms of trade. They do so by keeping the benefits of acquired technical 
progress in the country, helping raise productivity and domestic incomes and giving the 
infant, underdeveloped industry time and tools to develop77.  
 In Bangladesh, the protection of a quota system initiated economic growth in the 
stagnant textile industry and pushed the country away from traditional agricultural 
exports to low-end manufactures. However, this growth became extremely unbalanced 
and concentrated in the RMG industry: the ratio of RMG exports to total exports only 
increased. Destabilization did not give way to Hirschman’s (1958) strong linkages. 
Bangladesh’s garment industry works by turning cotton and/or other fibers into yarn 
using spinning processes, yarn to grey fabrics using weaving or knitting processes, and 
grey fabrics to finished products using dyeing and printing processes. Thus, backward 
linkages include improvements to raw materials and machinery for production processes. 
Instead, Bangladesh early on established a system in which it imported its textile inputs 
                                                 
77 Raúl Prebisch, "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries." The American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings of 
the Seventy‐first Annual Meetings of the American Economic Association) 49, no. 2 (May 1959): 256‐259.  
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from surrounding countries, giving it little control over the quality and timing received78. 
In a similar manner, poor distribution and marketing perpetuated by a lack of key 
transport, infrastructure and energy investments hampered forward linkages. 
Upon analysis, these linkages largely remained limited due to an inadequate 
amount of effective planning and investment. Illustratively, the GoB and private actors 
could not and/or did not adopt large-scale national-directed efforts to acquire higher 
technology and/or training. Following Lall (2000), unlike other countries, the GoB did 
not institute national policies that could have incentivized and assisted firms, both private 
and public, to overcome market challenges of imperfect information and costly 
technology. This kept the Bangladeshi garment industry at the low-technology end of the 
RMG market where value-added and profit margins were small. Instead, it continued to 
rely on labor costs as the primary element of its competitiveness. As it did so, its terms of 
trade deteriorated as its export prices fell disproportionately to the cost of its imports 
(Figure 9).   
Figure 9: Bangladesh’s Net Barter Terms of Trade, 2000=100 (1980‐2009)
 
Source: Constructed from World Bank, World dataBank (2011) 
 
                                                 
78 Most notably, cotton is used in yarn production but cotton production remains limited so spinning mills import cotton from Indian, 
Pakistan, China, Turkey, Uzbekistan and the USA; See Ibne Rakib Habib, "Backward Linkages in Readymade Garment Industry of 
Bangladesh: Appraisal and Policy Implications." Journal of Apparel and Textile, Technology and Management (College of Textiles: NC 
University) 6, no. 2 (Fall 2009). 
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Meanwhile, its largest competitors, i.e. China and India, embraced a more 
balanced export-promotion strategy earlier on79. They instituted a coordinated effort to 
substitute imports with domestic inputs by encouraging strong backward linkages to the 
agricultural sector. This fed the manufacturing sector its necessary imports. Illustratively, 
they subsidized the production of cotton at home to provide a cost and time advantage 
that improved productivity. For the remaining imported inputs, they used incentives, i.e. 
lower import duties, to improve delivery and quality. They also made critical investments 
in technology and training. Discussed below, this required a strategic approach to utilize 
financial flows. These policies attracted further investment and allowed them to move 
into medium-technology products that were more capital intensive and required higher 
skills (Lall, 2000)80. In Bangladesh, this period of protection did not successfully 
establish the policies or linkages necessary to develop and diversify further but instead 
encouraged greater export concentration.  
Second Period (1985-2008) 
In the second period, the industry continued to grow under the MFA, but the 
absence of key linkages and spillovers became more apparent. The industry fell behind 
due to a lack of strategic planning, accountability and adequate infrastructure. The BMTC 
also came under scrutiny due to poor management and corruption allegations. In 1985, 
Western markets imposed smaller MFA quotas on Bangladeshi exports, slowing RMG 
growth. To ameliorate the situation, the GoB turned to the IMF. It argued that 
                                                 
79 See discussion of this on the reason for the development of some Asian countries faster than others in Gustav Ranis, "Another 
Look at the East Asian Miracle." The World Bank Economic Review 9, no. 3 (September 1995). 
 
80 Sanjaya Lall, "The Technological Structure and Performance of Developing Country Manufactured Exports, 1985‐1998." Oxford 
Development Studies (International Development Centre) 28, no. 3 (2000): 342‐343. 
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Bangladesh should rely on its comparative advantage and remove any barriers, including 
government participation, to correct macroeconomic imbalances and attract investment. 
This neoliberal view argued that government inference had thwarted market forces, 
discouraged further economic development and prevented the linkages necessary to allow 
the industry to withstand international competition81.  
This went against the findings of many of the economists discussed in Chapter 
One who argued that market forces alone would actually work against the country. The 
GoB agreed to Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) to correct macroeconomic 
imbalances and to improve its financial climate. The SAPs focused on liberalization and 
privatization of the industry, away from the centralized control of the BMTC. The 
reforms did not deliver the results promised, discussed below. GDP growth declined 
further82 and deep deficits and high inflation remained.  
In the early 1990s, the GoB transitioned from semi-autocratic rule to a 
parliamentary democracy. In 1995, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC) phased out all MFA quotas by 2005. To adjust, the new government 
implemented further macroeconomic reforms to increase trade and attract additional 
investment83. These reforms, coupled with favorable international conditions helped the 
industry grow. However, in 2000-2001, a decline in the US economy compounded by the 
events of September 11, 2001, triggered a global recession. Macroeconomic shocks 
                                                 
81 For example, see discussion in Deepak Lal, The Poverty of Development Economics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, (1985): 72‐78. 
 
82 Illustratively, GDP growth was only 2.15% in 1988 compared to 7% in 1978 (World Bank, World dataBank (September 2011)). 
 
83 It continued to offer incentives to garment exporters, relaxed licensing requirements, and reduced import duties. It made 
telecommunications and infrastructure improvements. It also initiated financial sector reforms working with the Central Bank to 
deregulate the interest rate, increase access to credit, privatize banks and improve the organizational and technical capacity of the 
sector. 
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quickly rippled throughout the global economy and reduced Bangladesh’s export 
demand. Holding now over 76 percent of total exports revenues in the RMG industry, a 
decline in export demand hit Bangladesh hard. In total, export earnings declined 7.5 
percent and GDP growth fell .7 percent from 2000 to 200184. However, export demand 
rebounded as soon as international conditions improved:  Bangladesh was able to 
increase the volume of exports in spite of lower prices85.   
Key observations from this second period also demonstrate the creation of key 
vulnerabilities aggravated again in the 2008 crisis. Beforehand, Bangladesh’s competitors 
continued to face high tariff restrictions in the garment industry while Bangladesh largely 
did not. Instead, it continued to rely on high volumes of low-end exports maintained by 
cheap labor to capitalize on large rents. Now, in this second period of a phase out, 
Bangladesh had already captured the lower-end of the market but could not move into the 
higher-end of the market where it could have received more quota allowances86. The 
safety net was then completely removed.  
While many economists agree that protection policies should be taken away when 
the domestic industry can stand alone87, there is disagreement on the timeframe and 
recipe to do so. Developing countries with limited exports and financial resources often 
face higher adjustment costs associated with the removal of trade barriers. Adjustment 
                                                 
84 IMF, WEO Database (September 2011).  
 
85 Bangladesh’s export revenues quickly recovered, recording a 9.39 percent growth rate in 2002‐2003; of this, 7 percent of the 
growth was attributed to volume growth and 2.3 percent to price (Mustafizur Mohammad Rahman, “The Foreign Trade of 
Bangladesh: Its Composition, Performance, Trend, and Policy." School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, The University of 
Southern Queensland, Queensland, Australia, 1‐12 (2008): 1‐2). 
 
86 See Montfort Mlachila and Yongzheng Yang, "The End of Textiles Quotas: A Case Study of the Impact on Bangladesh." IMF Working 
Paper WP/04/108, International Monetary Fund, 2004. 
 
87 For a further discussion of why to remove protection, see Andrew Charlton and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Trade Liberalization and the 
Costs of Adjustment." Initiative for Policy Dialogue Working Paper Series, 2005: 170‐214. 
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costs are higher in these countries given their underdevelopment and include, but are not 
limited to, higher impacts to unskilled labor, greater implementation costs from weaker 
political and economic institutions, and few social safety nets (Charlton and Stiglitz, 
2005).  
In the case of Bangladesh, the adjustment period and reforms occurred in phases 
but did not address many of its internal vulnerabilities. Instead, they largely focused on 
increasing trade and financial liberalization by removing the GoB from the RMG industry 
and other industrial sectors, helping to make the adjustment costs greater. Bangladesh 
now largely lacked the national support necessary to make the large, overarching reforms 
in technology, training and infrastructure needed to develop the garment industry or other 
sectors by way of strong linkages or spillovers (Lall, 2000). Following Nurkse’s (1961) 
argument, the low productivity in these sectors from a small amount of investment and 
savings only maintained low levels of capital formation. This only encouraged further 
export concentration in low-end RMG garments that led to quantitative rather than 
qualitative (higher-value) growth. 
Additionally, this export concentration allowed Bangladesh to accumulate a large 
level of international reserves. Illustratively, the amount of international reserves, 
including gold, increased 248 percent from 2000-2007. This had a two-fold effect. First, 
aligned with the literature, this was an insurance source during times of economic decline 
and illiquidity, helping to stabilize its currency88. This helped the LIC during the 2001-
2002 slowdown and funded the continuation of imports needed for garment production. 
                                                 
88 Jacob A. Frenkel, "The Demand for International Reserves by Developed and Less‐Developed Countries." Economica 41, no. 161 
(February 1974): 14‐24, and John R. Dodsworth, "International Reserve Economies in Less Developed Countries." Oxford Economic 
Papers 30, no. 2 (July 1978): 277‐291. 
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Bangladesh repeated this strategy in the Great Recession: reliance on reserves and export 
growth fueled by volume rather than price. On the other hand, it also reduced pressures to 
worry about its export dependence. As Hauner (2005) found, reserve accumulation also 
carries high costs: in Bangladesh, the high-level from one source seems to have 
discouraged the need to develop other export revenue sources, and reserve stockpiles 
were not invested. 
Therefore, by 2008, Bangladesh’s trade sector had several structural 
vulnerabilities: it was undiversified, low-priced and labor-intensive. It used little 
technology and relied heavily on imports for inputs. Without adequate public or private 
policies to mobilize financial resources, discussed below, linkages and spillover effects 
were limited. Global competition had also increased significantly in the new post-quota 
system, and Bangladesh was losing its comparative advantage to countries that had 
adopted higher-value industrialization processes earlier on. Meanwhile, high poverty 
remained. Given these conditions, Bangladesh was categorized as highly vulnerable to 
the transmission and poverty impacts in the World Bank (2009) study.  
In fact, Bangladesh at first maintained high export growth by relying on its 
narrow RMG export base that utilized preplaced orders to fuel quantity rather than price 
growth and by storing the reserves from continued exports. However, it eventually saw 
decline through the trade mechanism that aggravated these structural weaknesses. As the 
global economy recovers, Bangladesh now faces a harsher environment. It receives duty- 
and quota-free access to the EU in low-end categories but so do its LIC competitors, i.e. 
Cambodia and Pakistan. Meanwhile, it lacks the ability to move into higher-value 
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garments where other competitors, i.e. China and India, hold a larger market share.  It 
also remains reliant on regional and bilateral trade agreements with regional partners for 
RMG production inputs89. Discussed in Section Five, it must now work harder to 
overcome these weaknesses. 
The Great Recession and its Financial Transmission (2008-2010) 
In contrast to the trade mechanism, the financial transmission had far less impact 
on Bangladesh. By 2008, the country still had a centralized banking system and a small 
capital market. This limited its participation in global financial markets and risky 
products that were primary carriers to other countries. Nevertheless, its shallow financial 
markets did endure the global economic downturn as asset quality and lending including 
trade finance declined, and as the volume of FDI and private portfolio flows fell. All of 
these, however, were marginal.  
The Great Recession had some, but not alarming, effect on Bangladesh’s 
domestic banking sector. This occurred through an increase in rate of growth of the 
number of banks’ NPLs: borrowers faced declining incomes and defaulted on their loans, 
increasing the growth rate in the number of NPLs from previous years to 9.2 percent of 
total loans in 200990. This number was disproportionately higher in the State-Owned 
Commercial Banks (SCBs) where the ratio rose to 21.3 percent in December 200991 . 
                                                 
89 Bangladesh remains a member of the WTO and the EBA‐Everything But Arms Initiative with the European Union, receiving duty‐
free access without any quantitative restrictions. For regional production inputs, Bangladesh remains a member of the Asia Pacific 
Trade Agreement (APTA); The BIMSTEC Framework Agreement; SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA); The Agreement 
on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). It also has bilateral FTAs with India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; Preferential Trade Agreement 
(PTA) among D‐8 Countries with Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey. It also had trade capacity 
building programs with Canada, the EU and UNCTAD. 
 
90 Bangladesh Bank, "Chapter 5: Banking Sector Performance, Regulation and Bank Supervision." 2009 Annual Report (2009): 39. 
 
91 Nazmul Ahsan, "NPL situation improves in SCBs." The Financial Express. March 19, 2011. http://www.thefinancialexpress‐ 
bd.com/more.php?date=2011‐03‐19&news_id=129756 (accessed June 14, 2011). 
 39 
This deteriorated the asset quality of many of these banks and increased pressure on the 
GoB to support them. The GoB offered short-term financial support, but it did not 
address the underlying issues that caused the NPLs in the first place including risky 
lending to the government itself, an inadequate legal and debt framework, poor loan 
screening, a lack of accountability and an overall poor credit environment92. Discussed 
below, the crisis then only exacerbated these problems.  
As the money supply contracted, the Great Recession also affected Bangladesh’s 
lending rate. The rate had been rising in the years prior and spiked in late 2007. It 
remained high due to unstable macroeconomic conditions, high administrative costs, a 
high NPL ratio and centralized market power that inhibited competition93.  During the 
Great Recession, it declined marginally in 2009 as the global economy slowed down and 
illiquidity rose. The BB adopted expansionary monetary policies to lower the rate to 
encourage domestic investment and reduce further liquidity problems (Figure 10). As a 
result, lending to the private sector grew slowly at 2.9 percent to GDP in 2009 and then 
sped up with liquidity injections in 201094. However, the interest rate quickly rose again 
shortly after. International bank lending also did not fall much considering the low 
proportion of foreign banks in the country (7%), discussed below. Trade finance in 
particular may have been harder hit: there have been reports of reductions in letters of 
                                                 
92 Syed Ali‐Mumtaz H Shah, “Bangladesh Financial Sector: An Agenda for Further Reforms.” Asian Development Bank, Philippines: 
Asian Development Bank (2009): 8‐12.  
 
93 Mustafa K. Mujeri and Sayera Younus, "An Analysis of Interest Rate Spread in the Banking Sector in Bangladesh." The Bangladesh 
Development Studies 32, no. 4 (December 2009): 11‐15. 
 
94 World Bank, World dataBank (2011) 
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credit from Indian banks to Bangladeshi exporters95, and this seems likely to increase if 
lower garment demand continues.    
Figure 10: Bangladesh’s Interest Rate (2006‐2010)
Source:  Constructed from The World Bank, World dataBank (2011)
 
 
The Great Recession also impacted Bangladesh’s capital market, but only 
marginally as portfolio investment and FDI were minimal to begin with (portfolio inflows 
were .2 percent of GDP in 2007 while FDI inflows were .9 percent of GDP). Net 
portfolio investment did fall as investors reversed inflows, and registered -159 million in 
2009 compared to 47 million the year before96. Considering only 2 percent of market 
capital comes from foreign capital, the effect was minimal and stock market 
capitalization kept rising. FDI also saw some effect: inflows fell from $1 billion to $700 
million from 2008 to 2009, or 1.3 percent to .7 percent of GDP (Figure 11)97. The largest 
declines were in telecom and the power, gas and petroleum sectors. Neither portfolio 
flows nor FDI flows have returned to pre-crisis levels, discussed below.  
                                                 
95 "Indian banks discourage importing Bangladeshi goods," Weekly Blitz. September 12, 2011. 
http://www.weeklyblitz.net/1792/indian‐banks‐discourage‐importing‐bangladeshi (accessed September 29, 2011). 
96Rahman et al, (2010): 16. 
 
97 Computed from UNTCAD, UNCTADstat Database (2011) 
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Figure 11: FDI Inflows to Bangladesh, in US Millions (1990‐2009)   
 
Source: Constructed from UNCTAD, UNCTADstat Database (2011) 
 
In other financial flows, remittances remained resilient but the rate of growth 
declined from 16.9 percent in 2009 to 5 percent in 201098. Total net disbursements of 
ODA fell 12.7 percent or $104.9 million while total commitments fell 10.3 percent or 
$186.14 million in the same period99. However, large development assistance continued: 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) country plan of 2011-2013 will bring $3.2 billion 
for primary education, and energy and transport sector and a $7.9 million technical 
assistance program. From 2008-2010, large international bank loans were not reported. 
However, the IMF approved a no-conditional $1 billion loan in October 2011 to 
Bangladesh under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the main funding tool of the IMF 
to LICs to help with poverty alleviation and times of economic crisis100. This is likely to 
cushion the negative effects Bangladesh has seen, or will see.  
 
                                                 
98 Based on 2010 estimates; In comparison to other LICs, Bangladesh has a large amount of emigration, with 3.3 percent of the 
population working abroad. As a result, remittances remain a large source of revenue for the country (The World Bank. "Migration 
and Remittances Factbook 2011." The World Bank (November 2010), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Factbook2011‐Ebook.pdf (accessed March 20, 2011)). 
 
99 OECD. OECD.Stat Extracts (2011) 
 
100 "IMF to impose no condition on $1b loan to BD." The Financial Express. October 4, 2011. http://www.thefinancialexpress‐
bd.com/more.php?news_id=151716&date=2011‐10‐04 (accessed October 7, 2011). 
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Financial Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability  
It is clear a history of limited, centralized financial development contributed to the 
crisis’ impact in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is not considered internationally integrated101 
and only really started to develop its financial system in the 1990s with its financial 
sector reform program, discussed in Section Two. By 2008, it remained heavily 
dependent on its centralized banking system and equity financing was extremely 
limited102. Banks fell largely into two categories: SCBs under the Central Bank and 
Private Commercial Banks (PCBs).  Domestic banks far outweighed the number of 
foreign banks: foreign commercial banks held only 7 percent of deposits in 2009 while 
SCBs and PCBs held 87.6 percent103.  
Formal banking was largely limited: only 25.5 percent of the population held a 
bank account104 and its services constrained to urban areas. The sector continued to be 
hampered by low savings, low incomes, poor infrastructure and low technical skills that 
limited resource mobilization and financial intermediation. Lending was largely to the 
public sector with short-term maturities105. Poor loan screening and asset quality were 
also concerning, especially for SCBs. This contributed to risky lending and a larger 
number of NPLs in Bangladesh’s banking sector in the years leading up to the crisis. To 
                                                 
101 Bangladesh receives a score of 20.0 for financial freedom from the 2011 Index of Economic Freedom; See Heritage Foundation, 
"2011 Index of Economic Freedom: Bangladesh." Heritage Foundation. 2011. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/Bangladesh 
(accessed July 23, 2011). 
 
102 For example, market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) was 9.9 percent of GDP in 2007 (World Bank, World dataBank 
(2011)). 
 
103 Bangladesh Bank, "Chapter 5: Banking Sector Performance, Regulation and Bank Supervision." 2009 Annual Report  (2009). 
 
104 United Nations, "Building Inclusive Financial Sector for Development." 2006. 
 
105 A majority of lending has a maturity period of less than three years (World Bank, End of MFA Quotas: Key Issues and Strategic 
Options for Bangladesh Readymade Garment Industry. Bangladesh Development Series‐Paper No 2, Dhaka: The World Bank: Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management Unit (December 2005).  
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address this, the government routinely held up many SCBs, viewed as “too big to fail”. 
As shown, these vulnerabilities resurfaced in the crisis.  
Despite expansionary reforms, interest rates remained very high. High operational 
costs, management inefficiencies and corruption, and cultural norms largely determined 
the rates rather than traditional market movements. This issue was seen again during the 
Recession: many countries saw their interest rates drop significantly, but the economic 
slowdown pushed Bangladesh’s rate down only marginally. It climbed quickly back up 
and remains particularly higher on working capital, trade financing and consumer loans. 
The rate spread has also increased at an increasing rate in recent years with changes only 
to the deposit rate, leaving the lending rate higher in Bangladesh. This has impacted the 
RMG industry, inhibiting capital resources needed to make many of the trade 
recommendations above. The Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Export 
Association (BGMEA) reports profit margin losses around 30 percent due to high 
borrowing rates that raise manufacturing costs106. Discussed below, as Bangladesh looks 
forward, this could detour investors and lead them to its competitors with lower rates107.  
Bangladesh’s capital market remained far less developed. By 2008, it had two 
stock exchanges and a bond market, but the supply of stocks and the demand for bonds 
were small. Instead, people relied on the banking sector where capital was easier to 
acquire and carried less cost and risk. The absence of the RMG industry in the capital 
market also discouraged financial development:  these small and medium garment 
                                                 
106  "Slowdown in garment sector avoidable – BGMEA." Fibre2Fashion: News. May 31, 2011. 
http://www.fibre2fashion.com/news/apparel‐news/newsdetails.aspx?news_id=99407 (accessed June 28, 2011). 
 
107 Bangladesh’s interest rate spread remains higher than in Sri Lanka and India but slightly below Pakistan (Mujeri and Younus 
(2009): 10).  
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enterprises do not normally issue equities to raise capital. Thus, the capital market needed 
more issuers but the number suppliers were limited without diversification away from 
RMG industry. FDI was also limited: the GoB has allowed foreign ownership and 
repatriation in most sectors but an official approval with significant paperwork is 
required. This process has been reportedly slow and corrupt, discouraging investors108. 
Instead, most FDI has gone to export-processing zones (EPZs) to encourage trade 
liberalization but has not produced large spillover effects to domestic firms.  
As a result, by 2008, Bangladesh’s banks and borrowers were limited in financial 
products and access. Vice versa, the absence or underdevelopment of productivity, 
technology and training left fewer incentives for the mobilization and utilization of 
financial resources. Without both pieces in place, the LIC lacked sufficient capital 
resources from both public and private actors to improve and diversify its economy 
(Nurkse, 1961). On the other hand, its small integration with a limited number of foreign 
investors significantly reduced its financial contagion from the crisis. Instead, its 
problems largely reflected the weaknesses of its banking sector. As it recovers, it will 
have to weigh the costs and benefits associated with this type of financial liberalization.   
 Moving Forward (2011 and Beyond) 
Export Concentration and Associated Vulnerable Trade Characteristics 
The evidence shows that low production costs at first allowed Bangladesh to 
maintain export growth throughout 2008 by increasing its export volume despite 
decreasing global prices. Preplaced, locked-in agreements and inelastic income elasticity 
supported export growth early on. This combination gave the GoB more export revenues 
                                                 
108 Heritage Foundation, “Bangladesh…” (2011).  
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and policy options to rely upon before it saw declines in both exports and imports in late 
2009. Nevertheless, the trade transmission eventually aggravated its weak export 
structure of concentrated, low-valued, labor-intensive and low-tech exports. This led to a 
decline in the rate of growth in trade flows that has not recovered. 
Moving forward, Bangladesh must become more competitive in its current RMG 
exports and diversify into higher-value garments. Without doing so, it will not be able to 
utilize the same strategies as before. Instead, its competitors will have already filled a 
large portion of these garment orders: China and India are capturing Bangladesh’s market 
share and expanding into other garment markets109. Other LICs are also serious 
contenders: Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007 that gave it access to larger markets, and 
Cambodia and Pakistan have reduced production prices and lead-time110 to fill orders 
quicker.  
To strengthen its backward linkages in the RMG industry, Bangladesh must take 
greater control of its production process to reduce its lead-time, fill orders faster and 
diversify into higher-valued garments. One option is to produce more inputs at home. As 
shown, the relationship between the agricultural and manufacturing sector was not 
developed early on and remains weak, making it rely on imports along the RMG 
production chain111. The agricultural sector employs more than half of the formal but 
unskilled labor force. Sector transformation will require more economic incentives and 
                                                 
109 Haider (2007): 9‐15.  
 
110 This is defined as the time required to fill an order from its receipt.  
 
111 This includes cotton production, spinning, weaving and knitting, dyeing and painting. 
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training112, as cotton production—for example—is currently not as profitable as other 
crops. This is the best option for long-term competitiveness, but may not be easy given 
the agricultural sector’s traditional methods and the stress to produce more food in the 
midst of rising food prices. Other short-term feasible solutions include using more 
bonded warehouses to store imports in advance, expanding regional trade agreements for 
inputs, and prioritizing infrastructure improvements to reduce transportation costs of 
imports.  
Bangladesh must also examine the productivity of its workers, another production 
input. Its history shows that extremely low labor costs that utilize its large but poor and 
uneducated population have created a comparative advantage in the industry. This also 
helped it withstand the crisis by keeping its costs low as prices also fell. However, it has 
also exposed the inherent problems associated with this type of cheap capital. Notably, 
workers’ productivity levels are becoming less competitive: one study found that while 
the best reported performance in Asia is 25.87 shirts per sewing labor unit, Bangladeshi 
productivity is 8-20 shirts113. This is unattractive to mass retailers seeking more and faster 
garment output per worker.   
Additionally, this comparative advantage has encouraged cost-cutting techniques. 
When export demand declined in 2009, many workers become un- or underemployed 
with less income and little chance for additional skills training. The effects were further 
transferred through a decline in incomes, savings and government revenues. In the future, 
rising competition and increasing trade openness will likely push wages down further and 
                                                 
112 The majority of subsidies to the agricultural sector currently are for growing food. 
 
113 Shamim Chowdhury, "The challenge before the RMG industry." The Financial Express. March 28, 2009. 
http://www.thefinancialexpress‐bd.com/2009/03/28/62343.html (accessed April 30, 2011). 
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put workers in more vulnerable situations, raising domestic and international concerns114. 
Bangladesh must improve its working conditions and labor rights to increase investor 
confidence. This will require efforts by multiple actors so that the cost is not solely borne 
by firms. At the same time, the GoB needs to invest in higher-level technology and 
training to improve worker productivity and increase skills used in higher-valued 
manufactures. In the long-run, this would yield higher profits to the firms by opening new 
markets and reducing dependence on low-end manufactures.  
In terms of forward linkages, Bangladesh will have to improve the distribution 
and marketing of its products. Assessments by The World Bank (2005) and IMF (2007) 
have put forward several options. Feasible solutions include a research center to 
encourage product and market diversification, image and brand building and human 
resource development. However, Bangladesh will be largely limited in this regard until it 
can produce the necessary backward linkages that could give way to spillover effects in 
the RMG industry. A step in this direction would require infrastructure improvements in 
ports, roads, railways and energy plants to reduce transportation costs and again, greater 
training at the national and firm level.  However, now in a quota-free system and with 
slowing export revenues, Bangladesh has less support with which to make these 
improvements.  
 
                                                 
114 Mustafizur Rahman, et al. Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on the Employment and Labor Market of Bangladesh: A 
Preliminary Assessment. A Report Prepared by the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) in Collaboration with the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), Centre for Policy Dialogue, (March 2009): 22. 
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Shallow Financial System 
Development of these linkages will not be possible without greater resource 
mobilization. The Great Recession did not heavily affect the Bangladeshi financial sector, 
but it did magnify the inefficiency of the sector and lack of adequate resources at the 
country’s disposal. This has led to poorer asset quality, high costs and mismanagement, 
all of which increase economic vulnerability. Failure to address these weaknesses will 
likely continue to discourage domestic and international investor confidence, delay 
critical technological and infrastructure upgrades for diversification and place undue 
financial burden on the state.  
As already seen, Bangladesh’s banks must improve their internal organization to 
strengthen loan risk classification beforehand and loan recovery processes afterward. 
This is especially important in SCBs, which have a higher number of NPLs115. This is 
challenging given the entwined conflict of interests of these banks: the government is 
their biggest borrower. The country has made some improvements in this area by hiring 
more workers to help recover loans, enforcing regulations and using credit bureaus while 
also working to develop the capital market and increase competition among banks to 
increase consumer choice116. However, more is needed to increase investor confidence. 
Additionally, the number of foreign banks remains limited in the country; more foreign 
banks could increase competition and improve efficiency. Bangladesh, however, must be 
careful that the spillovers of foreign banks are captured and that domestic banks are 
“crowded in” rather than “crowded out.”  
                                                 
115 The number of NPLs is 21.4 percent in SCBs versus 3.9 percent in PCBs and 2.3 percent in FCBs (Bangladesh Bank (2009): 39). 
 
116 See Syed Ali‐Mumtaz H. Shah (2009) for recent develpments in Bangladesh’s financial sector. 
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The crisis also demonstrated that traditional market movements do not determine 
Bangladesh’s interest rate and reemphasized those factors that do. It should reflect the 
additional cost and risk of lending to banks but as demonstrated, interest rates are not 
highly correlated to market deposit share. This indicates that other factors (social and 
political) are in play to determine why some banks have larger deposits than others. The 
BB and individual state and private banks could reduce the spread by improving 
regulatory mechanisms to gather adequate information and screen borrowers. Banks 
could also improve liquidity measurement tools to lower perceived illiquidity risks. 
Institutional efficiency should also be strengthened, especially among domestic public 
banks, to encourage competition and convergence on the interest rate. Again, more 
private and/or foreign banks may help.  However, monetary tools alone seem unlikely to 
solve this problem. Instead, it will require a joint effort among several stakeholders to 
reduce costs, risks and social patterns to incentivize lower rates.  
Next, the crisis showed that Bangladesh’s high reliance on bank financing has 
perpetuated the underdevelopment of its capital market. As it stands, foreign portfolio 
investment only accounts for 2 percent of market capitalization. This has reduced risks of 
capital flight but also hindered long-term lending needed for extensive development 
projects that require more time to yield returns. It has also put it further behind its 
international competitors: Bangladesh has the lowest ratio of stock market capitalization 
to GDP among South Asian countries including its competitors India, Sri Lanka and 
Pakistan117. The increased liquidity in other countries may mobilize financial resources 
                                                 
117 Stock market capitalization as a percentage to GDP is 17.8 in Bangladesh, below Pakistan (35.9%), India (60.0%) and Sri Lanka 
(23.9%) (ADB, 2009).  
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quicker and encourage long-duration projects given that shares can be sold for money. 
Also, without this development, public and private institutions have had to remain 
dependent on other costly, short-term financial sources. 
Last, the financial crisis did not spur a significant decrease in FDI in Bangladesh. 
This was because FDI has remained extremely small (0.92% of GDP).  Moreover, the 
connection between FDI and GDP growth through technology transfer remains weak 
with little evidence indicating that Bangladesh has been able to use FDI to yield industry-
wide improvements. The World Bank (2005) found that FDI has largely only benefited 
foreign firms as part of the EPZ. If Bangladesh hopes to attract more and better utilize 
FDI, it will need to address the issues that have discouraged FDI: barriers that have 
limited the capacity of other sectors and narrowed investment opportunities. Without 
these improvements, Bangladesh will find it difficult to attract further FDI. Meanwhile, 
its competitors are seeing greater inflows of FDI118. 
To encourage the capital market development, Bangladesh has made some strides 
by committing to a series of sequencing reforms laid out in its Financial Sector 
Development Plan (FSDP) in the next decade. However, its success will depend on its 
ability to absorb the reforms accordingly. As demonstrated in other countries, financial 
liberalization without adequate regulation and capacity increases risk that makes them 
especially vulnerable to host-country shocks and capital flight in times of global 
economic decline119. Bangladesh, unlike Zambia, has largely not yet faced this problem 
                                                 
118 FDI inflows as a percentage of the world total were 0.07% for Bangladesh, below 1.9% for India, 0.16% for Pakistan and 8.5% for 
China. It remained above Cambodia (0.03%) and Sri Lanka (0.03%) (UNTCAD,UNCTADstat Database (2011)).  
 
119 Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Risk and Global Economic Architecture: Why Full Financial Integration May Be Undesirable." American 
Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 100 (May 2010): 388‐392. 
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but could in the future, given increasing international economic and financial 
competition.  
Conclusions 
In summary, it is clear the Great Recession affected Bangladesh, despite it being a 
relatively insulated LIC. The severity of the crisis linked to the vulnerabilities of its 
economic structure that had evolved throughout its economic history. Trade became the 
primary transmission channel due to its large dependence on RMG exports (75%) to 
advanced countries. Bangladesh first maintained export growth but low aggregate 
demand eventually led to a fall in RMG exports. This contributed to a deterioration in 
annual growth of total exports: a .10 percent change in 2010 versus 11.3 percent in 2009. 
Growth in the volume imports also fell: to 9.6 percent in 2010 from 21.4 percent in 2009, 
largely in capital machinery, food, and other inputs needed for garment production. The 
decline in trade flows resulted in a deterioration in the BoP from $3.3 billion in 2009 to 
$2.3 billion in 2010, or 4.2 percent to 3.7 percent of GDP. This occurred largely as 
imports (i.e. RMG inputs) were reduced while export growth remained stagnant. 
Nevertheless, the BB took considerable efforts to stabilize its currency using 
stored reserves and had marginal appreciation against the dollar. Formal unemployment 
declined slightly, 0.1 percent, but could fall further as labor supply is expected to 
outweigh job creation.  As trade flows fell, government revenues as a percentage of GDP 
declined .5 percent from 2008 to 2009 and stagnated in 2010. Net lending/borrowing as a 
percentage of GDP declined 1.7 percent further from 2008-2009. Combined with fewer 
financial flows, this could strain government budgets and threaten development 
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initiatives. Meanwhile, while not explored, global food prices have risen in Bangladesh 
and could further exacerbate the situation120  
In contrast, financial transmission had far less effect on Bangladesh. This 
reflected its shallow financial system, highly centralized and dependent on the banking 
sector with large levels of state control and little capital development. The most 
noticeable effects from the crisis were then in an increase in the number of NPLs and a 
slight decline in the growth of lending. The interest rate declined only marginally, given 
the other factors that were controlling it. FDI also declined, falling from $300 million in 
2009 or 1.3 percent of GDP in 2008 to .7 percent in 2009. Portfolio investment also fell 
by $159 million in 2009 but remained too small to spur negative effects. Meanwhile, 
ODA and remittances grew at a slower rate of growth.    
Given these areas of impact, Bangladesh did not deeply suffer the crisis to the 
extent many had predicted: GDP contracted .04 percent in 2009 from the year before. 
However, GDP growth is not expected to improve significantly (.1 to .2% from 2011-
2013)121 given the sluggish but competitive environment in which it now finds itself and 
the key economic vulnerabilities that persist.  Long-term implications from the crisis may 
then still emerge. Larger future growth will greatly depend upon its ability to make 
improvements in these areas. Suggestions have been put forward with a focus on 
technological, educational and financial improvements, but all require a stronger 
institutional framework. This is a challenge in itself and calls for further international 
                                                 
120 Food inflation hit 14.36 percent in April 2011, compared with a 13.87 percent in March, driven by rice, wheat, sugar and edible oil 
global price increases. ("Bangladesh inflation quickens on food price surges." Reuters. May 24, 2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/24/bangladesh‐economy‐inflation‐idUSL3E7GO0V320110524 (accessed July 20, 2011)). 
 
121 IMF, WEO Database (September 2011) 
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assistance. In the meantime, Bangladesh seems unlikely to weather another global crisis 
as smoothly.  
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CHAPTER THREE: ZAMBIA CASE STUDY 
 Quick Impact but Stronger Recovery 
Following the emergence of the crisis, the World Bank (2009) also categorized 
the Sub-Saharan African country of Zambia as highly exposed to the transmission effects. 
Economists predicted GDP growth would fall and, development accomplishments to date 
could be significantly undermined in the country of 13 million people122. In the short-run, 
the LIC did see its trade flows decline, its currency depreciate, unemployment rise and 
government revenues decrease as a result of the crisis from 2008-2010.  Zambia’s 
financial sector, while shallow, also saw quick declines in its financial flows. These 
effects were quicker and more severe than in many other LICs, including Bangladesh. 
This in turn is linked to Zambia’s economic and financial weaknesses and has re-
emphasized the challenges it faces. In the long run, the remaining effects are still to be 
seen. 
In the same manner as the previous case study, this chapter explores how the 
Great Recession impacted the LIC through the trade transmission with effects on exports 
and imports and subsequently the exchange rate, unemployment and government 
revenues. It then examines how Zambia’s structural vulnerabilities contributed to the 
reach and depth of the transmission mechanism. Afterword, it examines how the financial 
                                                 
122 These concerns were in consideration of its initial 59.3% poverty level (2005) (Manenga Ndulo, et al, Paper 10: Zambia. Global 
Financial Discussion Series, London: Overseas Development Institute (May 2009): 7‐9). 
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transmission affected Zambia as a result of its initial shallow but unregulated financial 
system. Similarities with Bangladesh exist but specific differences emerge, and these are 
discussed appropriately. It concludes with recommendations to address these 
vulnerabilities. 
The Great Recession and its Trade Transmission (2008-2010) 
In early 2008, Zambia was the world’s eighth largest producer of copper, and the 
second largest copper exporter, mainly servicing buyers in China and European and other 
African countries. Mining, largely of copper and cobalt, comprised only 8.4 percent of 
total GDP123 ($15.2 billion) but almost 80 percent of export revenues. The remaining 20 
percent of its exports included tobacco, flowers, cotton, and electricity. Imports included 
machinery (i.e. boilers and nuclear reactors) food, oil, vehicles, and electrical equipment. 
Increased deregulation and foreign investment helped result in a threefold Zambia’s GDP 
from 2000 to 2008 (Figure 12 and Figure 13), with 75.6 percent trade openness.  
Figure  12:  Zambia’s GDP,  in  constant  national  prices, 
US billions (1995‐2011) 
Figure  13:  Zambia GDP Growth,  in  constant prices  as  a 
percentage (1995‐2011) 
 
 
Source: Constructed from IMF, WEO Database (October 2010). Estimates begin after year 2009.  
 
Mining of copper has been both an impetus and barrier to economic growth and 
stability in Zambia. High copper prices have served as an economic incentive to attract 
                                                 
123 The services sector was the largest contributor to GDP at 66 percent, followed by the agricultural sector and manufacturing 
sector. 
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investment and fuel production.  Low copper prices have reduced profitability, 
production and exports, forcing mines to close and reducing government revenues. This 
has led to unemployment and declining incomes that have exacerbated 
underdevelopment. This cycle would be repeated in 2008; in line with other LICs, the 
crisis’ trade transmission was the primary contagion carrier with noticeable declines in 
exports and imports, and subsequent impacts on the currency, labor market and 
government revenues. However, the timing and severity of the crisis in Zambia varied 
from other LICs, including Bangladesh.   
To begin, the quantity demanded and price of copper are largely determined by 
copper’s use as a production input in other industrial processes: copper is used heavily in 
building and construction and as a component in many car parts. Thus, trade flows 
became the primary channel as the recession induced a sharp reduction in the aggregate 
demand for copper. This was aided by the large decline in residential and commercial 
construction and the fall in the real estate market in advanced countries. Dependent 
largely on the metal, the price decline on the world market then quickly transferred 
negative effects to the Zambian economy.  
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Figure 14: Copper Price, in USD per metric ton (Jan. 2008‐
Nov. 2009) 
  
Source: Constructed from IndexMundi (2011) 
 
Figure  15:  Crude  Oil  Price,  in  USD  per  barrel  (Jan. 
2008‐Nov. 2009) 
  
Source:  Computed monthly  averages  from NYSE.TV Website 
(2011)  
 
Figure 14 shows the decline in the world price of copper in 2008. At its lowest, it 
dropped 64 percent from its highest point in the year. Copper prices also followed the 
drop in crude oil, a critical input in mining (Figure 15). The price fall led to an immediate 
decline in copper exports and production (Figure 16); exports dropped 58.5 percent from 
March 2008 to March 2009, or $244 million. Imports closely followed the export fall 
(Figure 16), dropping 46.8 percent from April 2008 to April 2009, or $246 million, due to 
a decline in production, real GDP, currency depreciation and incomes. Combined, this led 
to a further deterioration in its BoP from $-0.7 billion in 2007 to $-1 billion in 2008 
(Figure 17).  
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Figure 16: Zambian Exports and Imports, in US Millions (Jan. 
2008‐Nov. 2009) 
  
Source:  Constructed  from  Bank  of  Zambia,  Monthly  Bulletin 
Database (2011)  
 
Figure 17: Zambia's Balance of Payments,  in US Billions 
(2006‐2011) 
 
Source:  Constructed  from  IMF,  WEO  Database  (September 
2011) 
Given that its exchange rate is positively correlated to the price of copper, the fall 
in price and trade led to currency depreciation as the demand for the Zambian kwacha 
fell. The kwacha, depreciated 50 percent relative to the US dollar in 2008124. Like 
Bangladesh, Zambia relied on stored foreign exchange reserves to help cushion its fall, 
but in doing so, drew down its stored resources. As a result, net reserves fell further: 
roughly -1 billion in 2009 from -18 million in 2008125. In theory, the currency 
depreciation could have created a demand incentive for other exports, but these areas had 
limited capacity, discussed below, that prevented a shift from one sector to the next. Also, 
the currency depreciation made physical capital imports for development more 
expensive, including machinery and electrical equipment. This led to a deterioration of its 
terms of trade by 45 percent from March-November 2008126.  
While the recession impacted Zambia much sooner and deeper than Bangladesh, 
Zambia also recovered quicker. As the price of copper rose in 2009, so did production 
                                                 
124 Manenga Ndulo, et al, Paper 22: Phase 2 Zambia. Global Financial Discussion Series, London: Overseas Development Institute 
(January 2010): 27. 
 
125 World Bank, World dataBank (2011) 
 
126 Ndulo, et al, (2009): 15. 
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and exports. The price of copper bottomed at $1,806/ton in 2008 but resurged to 
$5,150/ton in 2009 and $7,535/ton in 2010127. Thus, exports rose back up to $418 million 
in September 2009, 48 percent from its lowest point in the year just seven months earlier. 
Imports also recovered, rising 30 percent in September 2009 from their lowest point in 
the year. This resulted in a surplus in its BoP from $-1 billion in 2008 to $.5 billion 
surplus in 2009 (Figure 17). This rebound was largely due to the composition of its 
demand and trading partners, mostly other African developing countries and China; the 
U.S. accounts for only 0.1 percent of Zambia’s exports. China continued largely as a 
consistent buyer and investor, helping to raise the price of copper. Copper’s flexile use as 
an input in other industrial sectors also restored its demand. In Bangladesh, slow 
economic growth in Western markets continued longer keeping export demand low, and 
competition was steeper with China and India as serious competitors.  
 Despite a quicker recovery, the transmission had subsequent impacts on the 
Zambian labor market. Mining is primarily capital, rather than labor intensive, reducing 
the potential effect by reducing the employment multiplier. Nevertheless, copper 
producers stopped production when prices and demand fell128, reducing the number of 
official jobs in the mining sector by 27 percent, or 8,100 jobs, in FY2008129. A decline in 
the formal labor market also had direct impacts on other sectors dependent on mining-
related activities, as drilling and construction are contracted out and not considered in the 
estimated official jobs of the sector. The informal labor market, 84 percent of the 
                                                 
127 IndexMundi. Copper, grade A cathode Monthly Price ‐ US Dollars per Metric Ton. 2011. 
http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=copper&months=60 (accessed May 5, 2011). 
 
128 Production also stopped much sooner as it involved more foreign actors who reversed some of their investment, discussed in 
Section Four. 
 
129 Mining jobs are about 30,000 but does not include contracting jobs as part of this estimate (Ndulo, et al, (2009): 21). 
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population, also likely saw negative impacts130. In Bangladesh, but not true in Zambia, 
garment exports (and low-end manufactures in general) could sustain jobs longer through 
wage cuts and other cost cutting techniques. In contrast, capital-intensive mining did not 
utilize the same cost-cutting techniques as long, and the structure of the work relied 
heavier on contractors it could not control. To date, some of these jobs have been restored 
but not entirely.  
Last, the decline in trade flows had important fiscal effects on the Republic of 
Zambia (RoZ). Government revenues and expenditures also have historically followed 
copper price trends, decreasing during low global prices and rising with higher prices. As 
will be discussed, Zambia has not successfully adopted countercyclical policies in periods 
of economic decline or expanded its revenue sources. This trait, explored further below, 
is common of the “natural resource curse theory” (Ranis, 1981) in which volatile 
revenues encourage governments to spend when money is readily available rather than 
making wise, long-term sustainable budget decisions131. The Great Recession 
reemphasized this dilemma: revenues as a percentage of GDP dropped almost 24 percent 
from 2006 to 2009 as mining taxes declined and incomes fell while a poor tax structure 
remained (Figure 18). Meanwhile, government expenditures shifted upward further 
covered by debt (Figure 19). Net lending/borrowing to GDP increased 1.7 percent.  
 
                                                 
130 These numbers have not yet been estimated due to a lack of data on the informal labor market. 
 
131 The Zambian government has tried to improve the tax structure to capture more resource rents from the mining sector but this 
has been largely unsuccessful: the sector only contributes 3 percent to total collected revenues. Macroeconomic pressures and 
increased competition have only discouraged a heavier tax structure. 
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Figure  18:  Zambian  Government  Revenues  and 
Spending, as a percentage of GDP (2000‐2010) 
Figure 19: Zambian Government Net lending/borrowing, 
as a percentage of GDP (2000‐2010) 
 
Source: Constructed from IMF, WEO Database (October 2010). Estimates begin after 2009.  
On  Figure  18 note  that  Zambia  received  significant debt  relief  assistance under  the HIPC  and Multilateral Debt Relief  Initiative, 
completed in 2005 and 2006, helping to ease government debt.  
 
Thus, the trade transmission had several immediate economic impacts on Zambia. 
A decline in world copper prices caused export and import declines that resulted in 
currency depreciation, unemployment and underemployment, and reduced government 
revenues, all of which could threaten long-term development goals. This largely resulted 
from its comparative advantage in mining that encouraged high export concentration 
dependent on volatile world prices. Its dependence on copper also led to a quicker 
recovery in both exports and imports. The impacts to Zambia from the crisis were not 
surprising. Instead, they link to its structural economic weaknesses, explored below in 
two periods: independence to 1991 and 1991 to 2008.   
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Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability (1964-2008) 
 First Period (1964-1991) 
Zambia’s history demonstrates the evolution of its export concentration that has 
brought unbalanced growth and economic vulnerability seen again during the Great 
Recession. Geographic luck and early mineral exploration in the late 1800s created a 
wealth of mineral reserves, but these resource rents largely accrued to foreign investors. 
It received its independence in 1964 as a former British protectorate. Like Bangladesh, 
the new government lacked the local human, political or monetary capacity at its 
independence to manage the industry alone and continued to rely heavily on foreign 
assistance.  
The new republic’s first president implemented a socialist economic policy 
focused on central planning and nationalization to regain control of the mining industry. 
Economic reforms in 1968 allowed the RoZ to claim large equity holdings in several 
foreign-owned mining companies, creating two national firms. In 1971, the RoZ created 
the state-run Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation with the country’s president as 
board chairperson. Like in Bangladesh, state management could have nurtured the 
industry, as mineral rents accounted for 40 percent of fiscal revenues132. In actuality, the 
RoZ largely failed to establish and invest in sustainable funds or projects, discussed 
below. In the short-run, the Post-War boom kept copper prices high and fueled narrow 
                                                 
132 Patricio Meller and Anthony M. Simpasa. "Role of Copper in the Chilean & Zambian Economies: Main Economic and Policy Issues." 
Global Development Network Working Paper Series #43,(June 2011): 50. 
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export growth. Copper exports then reached 95 percent of total export earnings and 
spurred GDP growth, averaging 6.1 percent annually from 1964-1974133.  
An increase in the world price of oil in the early 1970s resulted in a drop in the 
price of copper. Zambia quickly faced a balance-of-payments crisis as export earnings 
declined. The government responded by creating the Zambian Consolidated Copper 
Mines (ZCCM) Limited by merging two state mines, but it soon had financial and 
management problems as the government largely used it as a funding source. A lack in 
further exploration and infrastructure coupled with instable political conditions also 
increased risk, raised production costs and detoured investment. When the price of copper 
did not improve and the losses became too great, the RoZ adopted strict SAPs from the 
IMF that recommended trade and financial liberalization and the removal of the 
government in the mining sector. Like in Bangladesh, the adjustment period did not give 
domestic industries the time or capacity to adapt; as a result, the reforms largely failed. 
By the 1985, copper production had fallen -20.5 percent134. 
Several observations from this early period underscore the creation of the 
vulnerabilities highlighted in the 2008 crisis. First, Zambia’s geographic and colonial 
history helped create a comparative advantage in an abundant mineral. However, unlike 
with garments, copper’s price has been historically volatile, a statistical “random walk” 
characterized by up and down swings from varying demand and strict supplies limited by 
the nature of mineral production. This includes available ore grades, transport, energy 
and water. From this resource endowment, the country quickly became accustomed to 
                                                 
133 Ibid, 47. 
 
134 Ibid. 
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periods of economic boom and bust paired with a lack of institutional and monetary 
resources. This made the RoZ largely reactionary and its policies procyclical in this early 
period. As Adam and Simpasa (2009, p. 14) wrote, it treated the “temporary positive 
shock as it was permanent and the negative shock as if it was temporary.” 
In this way, Zambia’s export concentration exhibited the “natural resource curse” 
in which abundant natural resources yield high lucrative rents that often accrue unequally 
and deflect difficult policy decisions. In this way, a country can easily continue “on its 
old tracks” (Ranis, 1981, p. 215), encouraging economic stagnation or decline. 
Additionally, in many cases, efforts to capture rents lead to corruption and political strife 
which cause further economic distress. Sachs and Warner (1995), in their study of 
resource-abundant natural countries, found a significant negative correlation between 
resource intensity and GDP growth, arguing that these countries would have slower 
and/or poorer economic and political development.   
Zambia has been routinely cited as an example of this curse. The RoZ reaped the 
benefits of high levels of investment, production and exports during high prices but 
lacked the incentive and/or ability to invest mineral rents resourcefully or to store 
emergency funds. As a result, GDP growth fluctuated widely: -2.9 percent in 1982; 9.27 
percent in 1998; 2 percent in 1992;  -13.4 in 1994135. To cope with poor prices, the RoZ 
did not reduce spending (expenditures as a percentage of GDP doubled from 1970 to 
1991136) and increased its debt to cover fiscal gaps. Meanwhile, mismanagement 
                                                 
135 IMF, WEO Database (September 2011) 
 
136 This was 15.54% in 1970 to 31.82% in 1991 (Meller (2011): 120).  
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increased. In this way, the curse kept export growth significantly concentrated in mining 
and away from sectors that could have reduced economic vulnerability.    
Additionally, export concentration in this period made Zambia’s exchange rate 
dependent on the price of copper, creating a trade vulnerability that resurfaced in 2008. 
Illustratively, the kwacha fell 57.3 percent in value from 1981 to 1988 as the price of 
copper rose from $1.52/lb to $2.09/lb137. Both a contributor and consequence of the 
natural resource curse, the “Dutch Disease” theory holds that large inflows of foreign 
exchange from exports lead to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate and increase 
inflationary pressures (Sachs and Warner, 1995). During low prices, a decrease in 
exchange reserves often increases deficits and borrowing. Over time, the appreciation of 
the nominal exchange rate creates an incentive to move capital resources away from less 
profitable, non-resource sectors. Unfortunately, these other sectors may offer greater 
opportunities for positive externalities (i.e. technology) needed for economic 
diversification. In the case of Zambia, it became reliant on its international reserves, also 
highly dependent on copper revenues, and quickly depleted them during periods of 
economic decline. In the long run, critical capital and physical resources moved toward 
the profitable mining sector. 
Thus, the country soon exhibited a combination of the natural resource curse and 
the Dutch Disease, coupled with high poverty and a lack of institutional and monetary 
resources. Growth remained concentrated in primary mineral exports where the 
opportunities and incentives for division of labor, higher technology and ultimately, a 
higher standard of living remained low. Disequilibrium then could not give way to 
                                                 
137 Computed from Meller (2011): 108. 
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“complimentary” situations in which induced investment created from the mining 
industry lead to stronger economic linkages and/or spillovers; both the supply and 
demand impetuses were too small given the market and nonmarket forces working 
against the LIC (Hirschman, 1958, p. 71-72; 100). Instead, its terms of trade continued to 
weaken (Figure 20), as the price of manufactured imports rose relative to the price of its 
primary exports. 
Figure 20: Zambia's Net Barter Terms of Trade, 2000=100 (1980‐2009) 
 
Source: Constructed from World Bank, World dataBank (2011) 
 
Second Period (1991-2008) 
Zambia’s one-party ruler left office in 1991 following a monumental election that 
ushered in a multi-party system. Facing huge economic losses and declining growth, the 
new government again adopted SAPs to restore macroeconomic stability and facilitate 
trade and financial sector growth, discussed below. It limited state control of prices, trade 
restrictions and foreign currency transactions. But by 2000, the price of copper had fallen 
almost 50 percent from 1995. Copper demand shifted to countries perceived as more 
stable and efficient. Illustratively, while Zambia averaged a depressing -5 percent average 
annual production growth rate, Chilean copper production averaged 11 percent annual 
growth, fueled by lower-cost incentives, heavy foreign investments and a favorable 
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political climate138. In Zambia, debt amassed as GDP and revenues declined and reached 
over 200 percent as a percentage in 2001 and 2002139.  
Zambia received debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative in 2000 in exchange for strict macroeconomic reforms that further privatized 
the industry. It adhered, and by 2005 the country had $7 billion forgiven and had only 
$500 million in external debt140. Better macroeconomic conditions coupled with high 
world copper prices and rising demand encouraged new investment. The purchase of the 
country’s largest copper producer in 2004 by an Indian company provided capital 
resources to upgrade and expand mines, and processing plants. Meanwhile, reduced 
regulation encouraged Austrian, Canadian and Chinese investment along its mining belt, 
and the Chinese-Zambian economic partnership zone was created in 2007. By 2008, 
Zambia had regained its status as a top copper exporter.  
Two main conclusions from this period contributed to Zambia’s economic 
vulnerability during the Great Recession: first, investment in this period largely now 
came from large emerging markets including China and India. With little concern for 
local growth, they responded to high copper prices, high aggregate demand, and a 
reduced regulatory environment. On one hand, this brought critical capital that aided its 
economic recovery in 2004 and again in the Great Recession. On the other hand, there 
was now little ability to keep this capital in the country; instead, private foreign actors 
had plenty of self-seeking motives to move flows in and out of the mining industry, 
                                                 
138 Meller (2011): 15.  
 
139 IMF, WEO Database (September 2011) 
 
140 As will be seen, its debt began to quickly rise again.  
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discussed further below.  Moreover, they had even fewer incentives to make overarching 
changes that benefited other parts of the economy.  
Second, but in tandem, this period resulted in the almost complete removal of the 
RoZ from the mining industry and a decline in the amount of mining taxes. The state 
demonstrated fewer characteristics of the natural resource curse of the prior period but 
now had far less political or economic capacity to mobilize and utilize resource rents. 
Together, this too limited the ability to improve linkages, technology and training as 
discussed in Chapter One. Instead, exports remained concentrated, accounting for 
roughly 75 percent of total export earnings and encouraged further dependence on prices. 
As shown, the once world copper prices fell, the trade transmission hit Zambia severely, 
magnified by these deep-rooted economic problems. Moving forward, these challenges 
remain, discussed below.  
The Great Recession and the Financial Transmission (2008-2010) 
At the outset of the crisis, Zambia’s had a relatively centralized and shallow 
financial sector. It did not participate in off-balance sheet activities or invest in illiquid 
securitized assets. By 2008, its financial sector was stable in comparison to prior decades 
of instability and bank failures. Banks were largely foreign-owned141 but adequately 
capitalized. Portfolio investment had grown but still remained only .5 percent of GDP in 
2007. This was concentrated in a select group of mining companies on the Lusaka Stock 
Exchange (LuSE), the majority of shares foreign-owned. FDI remained positively 
correlated with copper prices and had risen on average 7.4 percent of GDP from 2002-
                                                 
141 Foreign banks had 64.2% while private‐domestic and public‐owned banks had the remaining (Bank of Zambia. "Annual Report 
2009." 2009. http://www.boz.zm/AnnualReports.htm (accessed March 20, 2011): 50).  
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2007 and reached 11.43 percent in 2007142. Nevertheless, its level of financial integration 
increased its transmission risk. These shocks were again deeper than in Bangladesh and 
largely attributable to foreign, unregulated integration established beforehand.   
Notably, examining the data from 2008-2010, the global credit crunch in 
advanced countries transmitted perceived risk and illiquidity to Africa. Commercial 
banks’ nominal and real interest rates rose, and asset quality deteriorated. In 2009, the 
number of NPLs increased to 12.6 percent from 7.2 percent from 2008143. This reduced 
banks’ return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA), and banks’ profits fell144. 
Illiquidity and poor asset quality drove up the lending rate, rising 4.9 percent from 
November 2008, peaking at 23.1 percent in November 2009 (Figure 21). As a result, 
domestic banking credit as a percentage of GDP fell .3 percent and credit to the private 
sector fell 2.9 percent in 2009145. The remaining recorded growth was due to credit 
expansion to the government while the proportion of credit to public and private 
enterprises, households and non-bank financial institutions all fell. 
Figure 21: Zambia's Interest Rate (2007‐2009)
 
Source: Constructed from Bank of Zambia, Annual Report (2009): 155.
                                                 
142 UNCTAD, UNCTADstat Database (2011) 
 
143 Bank of Zambia (2009): 40. 
 
144 Profits fell by 33.1 percent (Ibid, 46). 
 
145 Computed from World Bank, World dataBank (2011) 
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International bank lending also fell as foreign parent banks from other African 
countries and the UK also faced the credit crunch. It is estimated foreign assets fell 28.5 
percent from May 2008 to August 2009146. This was partially due to the Bank of Zambia 
(BoZ) restricting short-term foreign bank lending to no less than one year to avoid further 
transmission. This minimized further problems and subsequent large credit reductions 
were not recorded. In some cases, foreign banks injected capital into subsidiary banks to 
increase liquidity. The BoZ also utilized expansionary monetary policies to maintain 
stability. As a result, only one of 16 banks rated unsatisfactory in terms of capital 
adequacy, asset quality, earnings and liquidity in 2009147. Trade credit is largely still 
developing in Zambia and has not been reported separately from the overall decrease in 
lending.   
Zambia saw greater effects in its capital markets, as a result of capital flight. 
Foreign investors sold their assets due to plummeting copper prices, the depreciating 
currency and decreased confidence. The LIC recorded -74.9 million in net portfolio 
investment in 2008, or -5 percent of GDP, from -6 million in 2007148. The all-share index 
declined significantly in 2008 as foreign investors sold their shares, facing their own 
financial troubles at home. As a result, capital flight by way of the financial transmission 
caused the all-share index to decline by an average of 5 percent monthly from March to 
December 2008149. The volume of shares traded registered 203.5 million in 2009, the 
                                                 
146 Based on known information of foreign banks; Ndulo, et al, (2010): 8. 
 
147 Bank of Zambia (2009): 42. 
 
148 Measured as portfolio investment excluding liabilities constituting foreign authorities' reserves (LCFAR) (World Bank, World 
dataBank (2011)) 
 
149 Ndulo, et al, (2010): 6. 
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lowest recorded since 2002150. Portfolio investment has since recovered with rising 
copper prices (73.6 million in 2010), again demonstrating the volatile nature of the flow. 
FDI also fell as investors reversed their inflows. Zambia registered a 29 percent 
drop in inflows in 2008 as investors faced constrained markets and increased risk (Figure 
22). Net flows fell from 11.4 percent of GDP to 6.3 in the same period151. The amount of 
pledged investment also dropped significantly (80%) in 2009 compared to 2008152. 
Again, these effects were much greater than in Bangladesh. Discussed below, the reversal 
in investment flows during the financial crisis largely resulted from Zambia’s initial 
unregulated financial sector. High copper prices led to a return of higher portfolio and 
FDI investment in 2010, led by Chinese and Indian investors. As a result, FDI registered 
6.8 percent of GDP in 2010 and is expected to be higher in 2011 but still below pre-crisis 
levels153.  
Figure 22: FDI Inflows to Zambia, US Millions (1990‐2009)
 
Source: Constructed from UNCTAD, UNCTADstat Database (2011) 
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152 Ndulo, et al, (2010): 8. 
 
153 World Bank, World dataBank (2011) 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
 72 
Briefly, in other financial flows the most noticeable impacts have been in 
increased foreign debt. Zambia received increased monetary assistance from the IMF as a 
result of the crisis, increasing its SDRs from 62 million in 2009 to 256.1 million in 2010.  
With this funding, the BoZ borrowed $344.7 million from the IMF in 2009, a 70 percent 
increase from 2008154. This increased its external debt which reached $1.2 billion in 
2010, rising 140 percent from where it stood in 2005 after the completion of the HIPC 
debt program. Zambia is clearly not moving away from international debt as a funding 
tool, especially in hard times. Additionally, the African Development Bank (AfDB) went 
forward with two large loans to the LIC: $24 million in 2010 and $48 million in 2011 to 
help fund poverty reduction programs.  
Meanwhile, ODA remained stable, hovering around $700 million from 2007-
2009155. While it has not fallen significantly, it has also not increased to meet additional 
development needs presented by the trade and financial transmissions. Increased loans 
are likely being used to help address this gap. Remittances meanwhile have remained 
stable: they continued to rise but at a slower rate (they remained at $68 million in 2008 
and 2009 and increased slightly to $71 million in 2010)156.  
Financial Transmission Linked to Structural Vulnerability 
 Similar to the trade transmission, the financial transmission only re-emphasized 
the structural weaknesses in the Zambian financial sector. Beginning in the late 1980s, 
with the adoption of SAPs and into the early 1990s with the change in government, 
                                                 
154 IMF, Zambia and the IMF. September 24, 2011. http://www.imf.org/external/country/ZMB/index.htm (accessed September 24, 
2011). 
 
155 OECD, OECD.Statextracts Database (2011) 
 
156 Zambia does not have a large population abroad; with more people coming into Zambia seeking work from poorer African 
countries, more money flows out in the form of remittances than in (World Bank, "Migration and Remittances…” (2010): 261). 
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Zambia’s banking sector underwent significant deregulation and privatization. It removed 
interest rate and other lending controls. The 1994 Bank and Financial Services Act 
increased capitalization standards and allowed banks to accept foreign currency deposits 
in 1995. As a result, many largely foreign, privately owned banks and other financial 
institutions—backed by foreign parent institutions—opened. This process occurred much 
faster than in Bangladesh where financial development was more moderate and 
controlled157. Perhaps because of this quick transition, the BoZ largely did or could not 
adequately strengthen or support its domestic banks, and three commercial banks 
collapsed from 1994-1998 and four more collapsed by 2005158. This moved the sector 
further toward foreign ownership; by 2008, foreign-owned commercial banks held 65.8 
percent of deposits while domestic commercial banks held only 21 percent of deposits. In 
other LICs, this rate remained much lower, only 7 percent in Bangladesh for example.  
The long-term impact of foreign-owned banks to the domestic financial sector in 
LICs has been debated. In some cases, they can help a country achieve and maintain 
macroeconomic stability and efficiency. In Zambia, the parent-subsidiary relationship did 
have subsequent contagion effects but also helped ease illiquidity during the Great 
Recession. However, many of the “parents” were in other African countries that followed 
similar economic trends and were not involved in complex financial products. The BoZ 
increased loan maturities to avoid contagion but this may not have worked if the shock to 
the home country had been greater and/or their own financial integration had been larger. 
                                                 
157 For this reason, Zambia is ranked higher than Bangladesh in terms of financial freedom: it ranks a score of 50.0; See Heritage 
Foundation . "2011 Index of Economic Freedom: Zambia." Heritage Foundation. 2011. 
http://www.heritage.org/Index/Country/Zambia (accessed July 26, 2011). 
 
158 This was due to liquidity problems, poor asset quality, under provisioning of loans that prevented them from meeting their 
liabilities. They could not meet minimum capital requirements despite several BoZ injections. 
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In a future scenario then, this could still easily expose Zambia to home-country economic 
shocks (Stiglitz, 2010).  
Additionally, the spillover effects of foreign-owned banks, i.e., technology and 
training, remained small. Foreign banks appear to have contributed to greater lending by 
increased competition, but problems with financial inclusion, legal rights and regulations, 
infrastructure and technical expertise throughout the industry remained. These problems 
were larger and more noticeable in domestic institutions, moving deposits to foreign 
banks and putting domestic players at a further disadvantage. This follows Hermes and 
Lensink (2004) who found in their study of 48 countries that for the benefits of foreign 
banks to outweigh the costs to domestic banks, an initial level of higher financial 
development is needed. The Great Recession again demonstrated this disfavor as 
domestic banks, characterized by initial poorer asset quality, saw a greater impact159. 
Thus, foreign banks may have been crowding out domestic banks, which had not had the 
time or tools to adapt accordingly.  
Downward movements in portfolio investment and FDI also reflected the 
structural weaknesses of Zambia’s financial system. In 2004, the Private Sector 
Development Reform Program sought to encourage economic, e.g. infrastructure, 
improvements through private investment with revisions to the investment code and 
regulatory framework. The reforms allowed 100 percent repatriation of profits, free entry 
of investment in all sectors, trade reforms to harmonize the tariff structure, and the 
removal of quota restrictions. As a result, foreign flows increased160 but remained 
                                                 
159 For example, domestic banks saw a greater percentage of NPLs. 
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concentrated in a handful of foreign mining companies, where the profit incentive was 
greater. Inflows also became positively correlated with the price of copper, following 
volatile changes. High prices in the past decade helped these flows grow significantly in 
the years prior to the crisis, and FDI recorded an all-time high in 2007 at $1.3 billion. The 
Chinese largely fueled this growth, accounting for roughly of 12 percent of total inflows 
for the year161.  
Two large concerns arise from the unregulated increase in FDI and private 
portfolio flows. First, global financial integration can cause financial resources to flow 
outward in periods of economic decline in the global system or in the domestic (both the 
host and home country) system. The reversal of these inflows can cause further 
macroeconomic distress in the host country by exacerbating the existing macroeconomic 
weaknesses (Chang and Grabel, 2004). This is more probable if adequate regulation 
mechanisms are absent or limited. So-called “circuit breakers” or “rule(s) that limits the 
transfer of funds in and out of a country under certain circumstances” (Stiglitz, 2010, p. 
391) were largely non-existent in Zambia. This was the result of deregulation and 
privatization of the mining sector; policy makers viewed any controls as investment 
deterrents. High prices have kept investment from China and India flowing and reduced 
pressures to address this vulnerability. However, capital outflows—while brief—from the 
Recession reemphasized this risk.  
 Second, there is concern that FDI has and will be effectively used in Zambia and 
concern of its negative externalities. FDI and other private capital flows are minimally 
                                                                                                                                                 
160 Illustratively, FDI inflows increased roughly 400% from 2000 to 2006 (Computed from UNCTAD, UNCTADstat Database (2011)). 
 
161This represented $984 million from 2006 (Sarah Cook and Wing Lam. "The Financial Crisis and China: What are the implications for 
low income countries?" Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, England (April 2009): 4). 
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controlled or taxed, giving foreign investors large exemptions162 in exchange for capital 
resources. Like in Bangladesh, the RoZ was then left with little decision-making ability 
in its mining industry. Without domestic buy-in and proper regulation, FDI can cause 
negative environmental, social and economic effects in resource-rich LICs (World Bank, 
2003).  In this “race to the bottom” phenomenon, unregulated foreign investors will 
quickly and carelessly extract environmental and human resources, leaving little left for 
the host country163. The resurge of Chinese investment has re-raised this issue in Zambia 
as its investment has increased steadily while monitoring and transparency of the foreign 
actor remain weak.   
Moving Forward (2011 and Beyond) 
Export Concentration and Associated Vulnerable Trade Characteristics 
 The Zambian case has demonstrated the perils of a resource-rich country, 
booming in times of high prices with concentrated exports but contracting quickly in 
times of economic decline. The Great Recession aggravated this structural vulnerability: 
the decline in copper prices in 2009 from decreased aggregate demand caused copper 
exports to fall quickly. As a result, imports also fell with subsequent negative effects on 
its currency, labor market and government revenues.  Thus, one of the greatest lessons is 
the need for both improvements in efficiency of its primary export—copper—and 
diversification of its exports.   
                                                 
162 The industry sees 100% repatriation of profits. The 2007 budget increased mining royalties and tax rates somewhat but these 
changes only apply to new investments.  
 
163 Ha‐Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel, Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic Policy Manual. London & New York: Zed 
Books, 2004: 141‐142. 
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 First, Zambia must improve its efficiency in mining to remain competitive. Like 
Bangladesh, it needs to strengthen its production and distribution processes, or its 
forward and backward linkages. This will require greater attention to its variable inputs 
including labor, infrastructure, transport, energy, licensing and contracts. Its competition 
has already done so: when once Chile and Zambia produced comparable outputs of 
copper, Chile has surged ahead in the past two decades through these types of regulatory 
and cost improvements164.  Second, Zambia will need to make conscious efforts to 
improve its export diversification. The copper industry offers several higher-valued 
options into manufactures that use it as an input that could be made in-country. Other 
export sectors with promise include food and beverage processing, construction, and the 
manufacture of chemicals, textiles and fertilizer. The agriculture sector, comprised of 
non-traditional exports of tobacco, flower and cotton, also offer opportunities.  
This, however, will require directed efforts to work against the natural resource 
curse, Dutch Disease and the race-to-the-bottom phenomenon. As it stands, Zambia is not 
moving toward a policy of diversification: the percentage of non-traditional exports165 
has declined despite the fact that these exports are less volatile. There are several 
examples on how to overcome these development issues in resource-rich countries, and 
while they cannot provide an exact recipe, they offer some important suggestions to 
better harness and invest resource rents. In doing so, countries with abundant natural 
resources are more likely to achieve higher growth rates (Sachs and Warner, 1995). One 
idea is natural resource funds (NRFs), used in many mineral-rich countries including 
                                                 
164Meller (2011): 15‐17. 
 
165 These are sugar, cotton, tobacco, electrical cables and fresh flowers. 
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Chile and Botswana. Successful NRFs are countercyclical and increase macroeconomic 
stabilization, assisting in budget financing and encouraging critical savings and 
investment while reducing risk166. Botswana’s Sustainable Budget Index serves as a 
mechanism in which mineral revenues fund development expenditures and recurrent 
spending on education and health; non-mineral revenues cover other recurrent 
expenditures167 (Iimi, 2007).  
For Zambia to adopt an NRF, it would need to reconsider two things: foreign 
ownership of mining and associated profits. Foreign ownership has upgraded mining 
processes and reduced costs but its positive externalities have been limited. Mining 
revenue as a portion of total government revenue has been traditionally very low (3%), 
and privatization of the industry in 2002 has left the government with fewer fiscal tools. 
In order for the country to benefit from the resource rents, taxation of foreign mining 
operations must increase. Additionally, more government oversight is needed to increase 
both the capacity and capability of other sectors to absorb these resources. The country 
put forth a new tax regime in 2008 to increase the amount of revenues collected from 
foreign mining operations, but its implementation has not been pursued with the same 
vigor in the post-crisis environment, as competition for investment is stiffer.  
Economic mechanisms alone, however, may not suffice: several political and 
social variables are at work that must be overcome to use resources wiser. Among these, 
Iimi (2007) in a study of 89 countries found that successful natural resource management 
                                                 
166 Eduardo Ley, Exhaustible Resources and Fiscal Policy: Copper Mining in Zambia. Draft: Prepared for Public Expenditure Review, 
The World Bank (2010): 15‐19. 
 
167 Atsusi Iimi, "Escaping from the Resource Curse: Evidence from Botswana and the Rest of the World." IMF Staff Papers 
(International Monetary Fund) 54, no. 4 (2007): 663‐669. 
 
 79 
relies on good governance. This includes strong voice and accountability, high 
government effectiveness, anticorruption policies, and a consensus of the current level of 
industry regulation. Thus, the above economic recommendations may prove especially 
challenging considering that the RoZ has little political control of regulatory oversight of 
mining activities, and its society has high inequality that has contributed to social unrest 
and low government legitimacy.  Moreover, Zambia’s citizens are divided on how to 
regulate foreign investors, particularly Chinese interests. As Adam and Simpasa (2009) 
wrote, the “right model for the equitable distribution of the rents” is Zambia’s “central 
economic challenge now and in the future” (p. 49).  
Shallow Financial System 
 As Zambia recovers, the crisis has offered several future lessons to mobilize and 
strategically invest critical funds to implement the recommendations above. First, it re-
emphasized the need to strengthen its weak domestic banking sector. To do so, it must 
address underlying problems of illiquidity, declining asset quality, and high capital costs. 
These will require adequate infrastructure, technology and human capital as well as 
adequate regulations and accountability. Zambia has put forth initiatives to reduce risk 
including an overnight standing facility to ensure commercial banks’ access to liquidity; 
improvements in the credit bureau; a framework for channeling long-term funds; deposit 
protection scheme; and efforts to follow the Basel II Accord. The 2009-2012 Financial 
Sector Development Plan continues with these initiatives. However, these market-based 
financial reforms will require proper sequencing approaches with gradual changes to give 
domestic banks time to adapt to new standards.   
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Second, Zambia must increase financial inclusion, as the majority of its residents 
do not use a formal financial product, further reducing the amount of savings and 
loanable funds. As it stands now, the banking sector largely serves the government, 
corporate sector and the upper working class. Reducing the high cost of capital may help 
but the obstacles are also income-based: the most reported barriers include income and 
the perceived view that an account is not needed (roughly 76 percent reported these were 
the greatest barrier)168. Others include affordability, physical access, usage issues and 
eligibility appropriateness. Thus, financial inclusion could help improve livelihoods, 
further mobilizing savings. Namely, Zambia would be wise to extend financial services to 
the agricultural sector, where a majority of the poorest people makes its livelihood with 
non-traditional exports.  This would also help food inflation, which is slowly rising169.  
The RoZ has been less proactive than the GoB in this regard: food and agricultural 
assistance programs have not been reportedly cut as a result of the crisis but have not 
increased to match rising prices.  
Third, the crisis has again shown the weakness of Zambia’s capital market. 
Capital development depends on several factors, but improvements and diversification in 
its export sector could increase the number of participants. Unlike Bangladesh, a high 
level of participation of mineral companies offers an opportunity to increase financial 
resources and innovation. The government is also taking more of a concerted effort and 
has announced plans to sell government bonds on the international markets to raise 
                                                 
168 FinScope, "FinScope Zambia 2009: Top Line Findings." Final Report, 2009: 59. 
 
169 Food inflation increased from 2.9% in August 2010 to 5.4% in August 2011. Zambia saw significant food inflation in 2009 and 2010 
(around 20%) but has seen less food inflation decreasing largely attributed to better harvests.  This also may be a reason why 
additional assistance programs have not been pursued. (Zambian Central Statistics Office, "The Monthly." Central Statistics Office. 
August 2011. http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/media/vol_101_2011_the_monthly_august.pdf (accessed September 1, 2011)). 
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capital for infrastructure. If successful, this could improve the country’s creditworthiness 
and attract further investment. Other initiatives include encouraging corporations to use 
the debt market, investment guidelines, issuance of longer-term government bonds, and 
awareness campaigns of the stock exchange.  
In doing so, however, the RoZ must be more cautious. As it stands, there are no 
controls on the transfer of portfolio investment or FDI in or out of Zambia. The 2008 
crisis served as another reminder of the problem of unregulated capital flows: their 
reversal expanded the transmission by further reducing liquidity and investor confidence. 
As financial flows rebound, Zambia will have to make regulatory changes to better 
control the movement of financial flows in times of economic distress. Thus, it should 
work now to institute appropriate “circuit breakers” (Stiglitz, 2010). This includes 
improved legal and regulatory oversight that help the Zambian system detect, understand 
and respond quicker to market movements and associated risks. A NRF could also help 
by routinely setting aside certain funds that could not flow outward along with routine 
transparency and reporting from foreign banks and investors.  
Conclusions 
The evidence demonstrates that the financial crisis did have a noticeable impact 
on Zambia. This impact directly linked to the vulnerable structural features of its 
economy, namely concentrated exports of a low-valued but volatile natural resource. 
Additionally, its impact was deeper than in Bangladesh. The trade mechanism proved to 
be the most severe transmission channel, given the LIC’s heavy dependence on copper 
revenues. When copper prices fell, Zambia saw large declines in exports (roughly 58%) 
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and imports (46%) over a year. The resurge of the price of copper helped Zambia recover 
quickly and it registered impressive export growth in 2009. However, export growth grew 
only .3 percent from 2009 to 2010, a sharp decline from 9 percent export growth in years 
prior. Growth in imports also fell: -7.6 in 2009 from 8.9 percent in 2008, largely in 
machinery, food, and oil. Overall, Zambia saw a deterioration in its balance of payments 
from -.7 billion in 2007 to -1 billion in 2008 or -6.5% of GDP to -7.1 percent of GDP.   
This has had subsequent effects on the currency (depreciated roughly 50 percent 
against the dollar) and its formal and informal labor markets.  The transmission spread 
further by reducing government revenues: they fell almost 24 percent as a percentage of 
GDP from 2008 to 2009 as mining taxes declined, incomes fell and a poor tax structure 
remained. Meanwhile, public expenditures continued to shift upward, funded by 
international borrowing. The net lending/borrowing ratio to GDP increased 1.7 percent 
and has remained negative.  
In contrast, the financial transmission had less effect than the trade transmission 
but also directly linked to the sector’s structural vulnerabilities. While shallow with 
limited resources, the Zambian case demonstrated the financial risks that come with even 
smaller levels of integration. In the banking sector, the most noticeable effects were in an 
increase in the NPLs, an increase in the interest rate (4.9%) and a reduction in lending 
(domestic credit to the private sector to GDP fell 2.9 percent in 2009). In the capital 
markets, FDI and portfolio flows declined due to capital flight as foreign investors 
liquidated their assets due to poor economic conditions at home. Net portfolio investment 
registered -74.9 million (0.5% of GDP). FDI inflows fell 5.09 percent of GDP in 2009 
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from 2008, registering $650 million. Meanwhile, ODA declined slightly while 
remittances remained strong.   
Overall, Zambia’s GDP growth contracted .5 percent in 2008 from 2007 from the 
international economic downturn170. Given its partnership with China and the rebound of 
the price of copper on the world market, Zambia recovered much quicker than in 
Bangladesh. It registered 7.6 percent growth in 2010, its highest recorded annual growth 
rate ever171.  It is expected to see steady annual growth in the years to come. However, its 
structural weaknesses persist as world food and fuel prices rise and global economic 
conditions remain uncertain. Given the unregulated economic and financial environment 
Zambia has embraced, failure to implement better controls is likely to magnify the reach 
and intensity of future global shocks. 
 
                                                 
170 IMF, WEO Database (September 2011) 
 
171 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARISONS, CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
This project has demonstrated how LICs became susceptible to the Great 
Recession through three main transmission channels: trade flows, rising food and fuel 
prices, and financial flows. It then linked the severity of the transmission channels to key 
structural vulnerabilities in LICs. This framework provided the background to examine 
the crisis’ effect on two LICs, Bangladesh and Zambia, and the initial weaknesses that 
made each more vulnerable. The main conclusions of these case studies are summarized 
below along with considerations for other LICs embarking on trade and financial 
liberalization in an increasingly globalized world.    
The Trade Transmission: Conclusions and General Recommendations 
It has been shown that while the trade mechanism reduced flows deeper in high 
and middle-income countries, LICs also saw negative impacts as a result of decreased 
aggregate demand. In both case studies, high export concentration (70-80%) in the 
number of products and buyers increased the severity of the transmission. Bangladesh 
was able to maintain high volumes of its RMG exports and as a result, saw less initial 
impact. Meanwhile, Zambia saw immediate effects as the price of copper fell with a drop 
in retail housing and commercial construction spurring a reduction in copper exports and 
production. However, it also recovered sooner as the price of copper improved. 
Meanwhile, Bangladesh continued to face slow economic growth. 
Nevertheless, both countries experienced volatile movements in their trade flows 
from 2008-2010. Zambia’s exports dropped roughly 59 percent from the lowest to the 
highest point in a year while Bangladesh saw a 30 percent change. Zambia recovered in 
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early 2009, but the downturn still resulted in only a small increase in total export growth. 
The rate of export growth rose .3 percent, from 19.4 percent to 19.7 percent from 2009 to 
2010. This small gain was significantly less than in years prior in which it recorded 8-9 
percent gains. Bangladesh’s rate of export growth also slowed, rising only .1 percent in 
2010 from 2009 (16.5 percent to 16.6 percent), a noticeable reversal from its strong gains 
(10 percent annual growth) in the years prior to the crisis.   
Both countries also saw a reduction in imports, largely of production inputs and 
food, resulting from decreased output and higher prices. Currency depreciation in Zambia 
also made imports more expensive, and it saw a roughly 47 percent drop in imports from 
2008 to 2009 while Bangladesh saw a 22 percent decline. As result, Zambia’s import 
growth fell -7.6 percent in 2009 from 8.91 percent in 2008 but rose again in 2010172. 
Bangladesh’s imports increased only 9.6 percent in 2010, from 21 percent in 2009, and 
slowed in 2011.  
The combined effect has caused further deterioration in the BoP in both LICs but 
for different reasons. The BoP fell to $2.3 billion in 2010 from $3.3 billion in 2009 in 
Bangladesh, and to $-.1 billion in 2009 from $-.7 billion in 2008 in Zambia. The 
difference between the two LICs reflects the overall economic environment faced by each 
country as well as its unique economic structural conditions. In Zambia, its improvement 
in copper exports, driven by Chinese investment, helped offset the effect of more 
expensive imports. Meanwhile, the gap in Bangladesh was largely due to lower imports 
from less RMG production for export.  
                                                 
172 Following the rest of the project conclusions, the years of comparison vary as Bangladesh had a delayed response. Thus, the years 
of impact for Zambia were 2007‐early 2009 while Bangladesh saw impacts from late 2008 to 2010.     
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Downward movements in trade flows had subsequent effects in both LICs, 
extending the transmission story to the micro level. As a result of decreased exports, 
production fell in both countries. Neither reported large effects in the formal market but 
underemployment increased in both LICs. Zambia appears to have seen a greater effect in 
both its formal and informal labor markets. Bangladesh instead was able to use other 
cost-cutting techniques common in low-end manufactures that again raised humanitarian 
concerns. The decline in trade flows and household income also reduced government 
revenues in both countries. This strained government budgets and increased net 
borrowing/lending as a percentage of GDP by roughly the same amount           (-1.75%). 
Coupled with rising prices, these effects then raised long-term development concerns at 
the micro level.   
In line with the framework presented in Chapter One, these impacts and their 
severity fed off each country’s structural vulnerabilities. Both countries became more 
susceptible to the trade transmission as a result of high export concentration in low-value, 
low-technology primary commodities and manufactures that had little capacity to 
improve efficiency and diversification into higher-value opportunities. Coupled with 
trade liberalization in the past decade, a lack of adequate fiscal and monetary impetuses 
perpetuated these problems and increased their risk.   
 
Considerations for Other LICs  
This project showed that export growth for many LICs is usually undiversified. 
As discussed, this is an often unavoidable situation: their comparative advantage tends to 
be in low-valued, low-tech exports with volatile prices that tend toward deteriorating 
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terms of trade that puts them at a further disadvantage. Furthermore, this export 
dependence brings increased vulnerability and risk in periods of lower demand, as they 
have little ability to spread their risk among a variety of export sectors. Additionally, 
unbalanced and unutilized growth tends to limit the resources applied to and capacity of 
other sectors, further diminishing the opportunities for linkages and spillover effects 
within an economy.   
To overcome this process and diversify outward requires deliberate actions that 
often counteract market forces; economic incentives must be created at both the firm and 
national level where they currently do not exist or are too weak to adopt new training and 
technology for greater export opportunities (Lall, 2000). This in turn requires effective 
political, financial and human resources. This process is also not quick, as LICs often 
internally lack these resources and capacity; therefore, policy sequencing and/or a type of 
protection may be needed to give fledging industries time and ability to compete. Without 
this nurturing, trade barriers alone may not produce the benefits needed to create 
competitive industries, as seen primarily in Bangladesh.  
Another applicable lesson is to not only diversify outward but to become more 
competitive in the goods LICs are currently producing and exporting. In both case 
studies, the LICs were losing part of their market share to international competitors who 
made strategic investments earlier on. Critically, many of them had stronger institutions 
and greater resources that reduced costs and improved efficiency for scalable growth. 
However, LICs often lack many of these assets. Thus, when they seek to improve 
production and distribution processes in their current exports, they must be especially 
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careful of common negative externalities of economic efficiency that they may not be 
able to control. The Recession has again demonstrated the effects of increased pressures 
on LICs to reduce regulations and taxation to attract more buyers and sellers. 
Unmanaged, this can lead to further resource degradation and underdevelopment. 
With these goals in mind, LICs will also need to strengthen the link between their 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors.  Traditional wisdom has said to move resources 
away from agriculture toward manufactures to avoid volatile, low prices and increase 
opportunities for growth. However, the need to better utilize and further upgrade the 
agricultural sector is becoming more apparent, especially as global food prices rise and 
low-value manufactures demonstrate the same vulnerabilities as primary commodities. 
Improving this link could reduce deteriorating terms of trade and its associated effects by 
reducing import costs as well as providing export inputs. Additionally, technical 
improvements in the agricultural sector would engage more of the LIC’s unskilled work 
force in opportunities with greater division of labor and training. This will require 
incentives in a sector that traditionally has had low profitability. 
Several questions arise on who should be involved in this process. Both case 
study countries went through two distinct periods: one with a high-level of state 
involvement and the other without. Periods of state control in both LICs did not largely 
produce the successful export-led management seen in other countries. In Bangladesh, 
state control of the RMG industry quickly became corrupted and bankrupted the industry, 
while state management in Zambia focused on short-term mining projects rather than 
long-term development initiatives. On the other hand, privatization of industries removed 
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economic control almost entirely from the state and placed it in private hands. This 
limited the amount of regulation and oversight that could be enforced, and the amount of 
revenues that could be collected. This raised greater concern in Zambia where the 
industry became largely foreign-owned whereas the industry remained largely 
domestically-owned in Bangladesh. In both cases in both periods, economic 
diversification remained limited while efficiency declined, reflecting the additional 
internal deficiencies and external conditions faced by these LICs. Moving forward, 
questions of foreign participation in lucrative industries are likely to become more 
critical, especially in the rise of Chinese and Indian investment in LICs. Thus, LICs 
should go slow and develop appropriate policies to utilize resource rents.  
The Financial Transmission: Conclusions and General Recommendations 
In contrast, the financial transmission had far less impact on LICs than the trade 
mechanism. It also had less effect on LICs than MICs and HICs, given their limited 
integration. However, the severity of the transmission varied among LICs according to 
each country’s financial structure and associated weaknesses. From the case studies, 
Zambia saw deeper impacts than Bangladesh. In banking and lending, both countries saw 
the number of NPLs increase and a reduction in lending as liquidity dried up. However, 
Bangladesh’s banking sector was controlled by domestic actors (93% deposit control) 
while Zambia’s sector was controlled by foreign participants (65% deposit control). This 
brought different challenges during the economic decline: Bangladesh’s problems 
pertained to asset quality, transparency, and poor management while it better managed its 
interest rate and liquidity. Meanwhile, Zambia’s problems dealt with direct market 
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changes as liquidity fell and its interest rate climbed 4.9 percent. Foreign participation 
also threatened it with a decline in international bank lending. As a result, lending to the 
domestic private sector fell in Zambia while only slowed down in Bangladesh173.  
In the capital markets, portfolio investment remained small in both countries but 
much higher in Zambia. Zambia saw an immediate effect in capital flight as foreign 
investors liquidated their assets: it registered -74.9 million in portfolio investment in 2008 
(0.6% of GDP) from -6 million the year prior. In comparison, Bangladesh registered 31.6 
million in portfolio investment in 2009 (0.03% of GDP) but saw a decline of -612 million 
in 2010 (0.6% of GDP) as its trade flows fell. FDI also remained small in both countries 
but again was higher as a percentage of GDP in Zambia, where it was also unregulated174. 
As a result, while both saw a drop in FDI around 30% over a year, it had a greater impact 
in Zambia. However, Zambia has since seen larger growth in FDI while its growth in 
Bangladesh remains minimal, likely given increased industry competition175. In other 
flows, ODA and remittances remained relatively stable in both countries. Zambia, more 
than Bangladesh, has increased its borrowing with the IMF and development banks, 
largely due to greater immediate effects.  
 Like the trade transmission, the severity of the financial transmission linked to the 
financial vulnerabilities in both countries. Shallow financial systems limited its effects 
but did not isolate the LICs completely. Foreign actors in both the money and capital 
markets increased financial integration and risk, further opening both countries to global 
                                                 
173 This was a 2.9 percent decline to GDP in Zambia versus a 2.9 percent increase in Bangladesh, slower than in years past.  
 
174 This was 6.34% versus 0.92% in Bangladesh (UNTCAD, UNCTADstat Database (2011)). 
 
175 Also, not having China as a partner reduced the amount of FDI to Bangladesh. 
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shocks. This encouraged unregulated financial flows, especially in Zambia. This resulted 
in quick capital movements in and out of the country, threatening macroeconomic 
stability. Issues in the banking sector also resurfaced in both countries as a result of the 
crisis including poor management, illiquidity, asset quality and high interest rates. Again, 
asset ownership (domestic v. foreign) helped determine what problems were aggravated 
more than others.  
Considerations for other LICs  
Throughout this project, it has been shown that LICs require more financial 
resources but also better systems to mobilize them effectively. In general, many LICs 
must strengthen their domestic banking sectors. The case studies demonstrated the 
different problems associated with different frameworks. In Bangladesh, the sector 
remained largely domestic-owned with high state involvement. This led to moderate 
growth but high costs, corruption and low transparency. In the crisis, these weaknesses 
resurfaced. Meanwhile, foreign banks largely controlled the sector in Zambia as a result 
of rapid financial liberalization. They have increased competition and lowered borrowing 
costs, but also pushed domestic banks out of the sector and generated few spillover 
effects to the remaining domestic banks. They could also make Zambia vulnerable to 
shocks in their own home countries in a future scenario. As LICs embrace financial 
liberalization with more private and foreign actors, they will need to consider how this 
composition affects the sector as a whole and adjust regulations appropriately.    
Additionally, LICs need to better mobilize resources by increasing financial 
access and products to other economic sectors and to those who remain under- or 
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unbanked. In addition to bank reforms, this includes the need to further develop the 
capital market for further financial development. As it stands now, it remains very limited 
in LICs, despite growth in incomes, savings, and lower inflation and currency 
stabilization. This underdevelopment can further hinder long-term public and private 
credit needs and put individual LICs behind other emerging market competitors. Instead, 
LICs should work with stakeholders to address the market and non-market barriers that 
detour investment, including legal, political and social impediments.  Many LICs have 
begun to do so through national financial development plans but will require additional 
support moving forward. 
  But as shown in this project, LICs must also better monitor and utilize the 
resources they do have. Financial development in LICs often requires a system to 
regulate and monitor resource allocations, namely those who will benefit. This is 
especially critical in resource-rich countries like Zambia where lucrative resource rents 
can discourage long-term, wise investments and lead to further economic and political 
distress. Financial development also requires “circuit breakers” (Stiglitz, 2010) that limit 
the movement of financial flows to prevent capital flight and subsequent domestic 
instability. This also has been included in many national development policies but in 
many cases, incentives to attract financial flows have outweighed the appropriate 
regulation and oversight. Moving forward, as LICs become more integrated, they will 
need to make more concerted efforts in this regard to protect themselves in periods of 
economic decline.  
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The above recommendations will require a larger institutional presence and 
greater accountability from both domestic and international institutions. Governments 
with a larger fiscal space generally have greater access to macroeconomic countercyclical 
policies to help their citizens cope with negative external shocks. At the household level, 
governments with pro-poor policies and/or assigned government funds can increase 
public transfers and in-kind services to poor people to better protect them. Bangladesh, 
more than Zambia, increased these types of programs while Zambia largely only 
maintained current social programs. Moving forward, both of these governments and 
many LICs will require better systems to appropriately manage their fiscal resources in 
both good and bad times in order to see long-term development.  
Conclusions and Future Questions 
This project has served as an evaluation of the evidence to date. At the start of the 
crisis, both countries had been categorized as highly exposed to the poverty effects of the 
Great Recession (World Bank, 2009). The findings show that increased trade and 
financial openness increased the contagion effects of the crisis and led to declining GDP 
growth in both countries: 0.04 percent in Bangladesh and 0.5 percent in Zambia176. 
However, in terms of lasting effects, at this point it is safer to say that the trade and 
financial transmissions contributed to lower growth rates in both countries and, coupled 
with other global factors, i.e. rising prices, debt crises, and increasing competition, they 
could have long-term impacts at the macro and micro level.  
                                                 
176 This was in the years they demonstrated the effects of the crisis: 2008 in Zambia and 2009 in Bangladesh (IMF, WEO Database 
(September 2011)). 
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That being said, both countries have seen economic recovery, aided by 
international institutions including the IMF, ADB and AfDB and domestic governmental 
programs. The IMF is also optimistic about their future: Bangladesh is expected to return 
to and Zambia will surpass pre-crisis GDP growth levels in 2011177. Bangladesh, like the 
rest of Asia, is expected to continue growing, but less quickly as external aggregate 
demand from advanced countries remains lower. The internal vulnerabilities of 
Bangladesh may also result in less growth than its neighbors. In contrast, Sub-Saharan 
Africa has maintained high growth rates in spite of the continued global slowdown. If 
copper prices and Chinese investment continue, growth is expected to remain quite high 
in Zambia.  
This has reduced concerns of the long-term impacts of the crisis but also raised 
new questions. While optimistic, the IMF (WEO, September 2011) also warned against 
the instability of the global system writing,  
“Almost three years after the crisis, the global economy continues to be 
challenged with intermittent volatility. Economic performance has become even 
more bipolar in nature, with anemic growth in economies with large pre-crisis 
imbalances and robust activity in many others” (p. 1).  
Given this risk then, LICs with larger trade and financial openness and inherent 
instabilities are not isolated and could see the severity and frequency of global shocks 
rise.     
Additionally, in evaluating these questions, several methodological issues remain. 
First, it will be difficult to disaggregate the causes of any single phenomenon considering 
the other simultaneous but intertwined macroeconomic shocks at work, i.e. food prices 
                                                 
177 IMF, "World Economic Outlook: Slowing Growth, Rising Risks." IMF Website. September 2011.  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/pdf/text.pdf (accessed September 24, 2011). 
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and debt crises. Second, it is challenging to get timely and accurate data from LICs to 
compare them. Instead, much of the data from comes from anecdotal reports that do not 
quantify the full effect. This is especially true at the micro level; thus, our understanding 
of how the crisis has affected the poorest citizens may be too optimistic. Third, it is 
difficult to fairly compare two countries with so many variables. By sheer economic 
indicators, one could conclude Zambia fared worse than Bangladesh in the two years 
studied. This ignores Zambia’s quick recovery and the more positive environment it now 
faces. It also discounts social and political variables reacting to decreased growth and 
rising prices that may not manifest themselves in economic indicators.   
And last, this project has focused not only on the economic impact but the 
structural vulnerabilities behind it, which the author believes are more critical for 
recovery and sustainable development. With this perspective, it is clear that the failure to 
address these weaknesses by both domestic and international actors will likely perpetuate 
the same problems and cycles of underdevelopment in these countries. A better 
understanding of these weaknesses is not simple, as many factors are also in play here. 
As seen, economic processes after all do not happen in isolation, and underdevelopment 
results from much more than financial and economic factors. Exploring and 
understanding this then is critical in order to better equip LICs for future transmission 
channels; to date, this seems to be the greatest lesson of the crisis. 
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APPENDIX A 
Countries used to compute Figures 1 and 2; As of the April 2011 World Bank Income 
Classifications: Low-income: $995 GNI per capita or less, Lower-middle income, $996 - 
$3,965; Upper-middle income, $3,966 - $12,265; and High income: $12,266 or more.  
 
Lower  income 
countries & territories: 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Kenya 
Korea 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao People's 
Democratic Republic 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
The Gambia 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
 
Excluded  
(data problems) 
Liberia (only in 1.2 
excluded) 
Somalia 
Zimbabwe 
 
Lower-middle income 
countries & territories:  
Angola 
Armenia 
Belize 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
China 
Republic of Congo 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Georgia 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kiribati 
Kosovo 
Latvia 
Lesotho 
Maldives 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
 
 
 
Philippines 
Samoa 
São Tomé and Príncipe 
Senegal 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Thailand 
Democratic Republic of  
Timor-Leste 
Tonga 
Tunisia 
Turkmenistan 
Tuvalu 
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Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Vietnam 
Republic of Yemen 
 
Excluded  
(data problems) 
Iraq 
Marshall Islands 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 
Tuvalu 
West Bank and Gaza 
 
Upper-middle income 
countries & territories:  
Albania 
Algeria 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Gabon 
Grenada 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Jamaica 
Kazakhstan 
Lebanon 
Libya* (2006-2010 
years)  
Lithuania 
Macedonia, FYR 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Montenegro 
Namibia 
Panama 
Peru 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
South Africa 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Suriname 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
 
Excluded  
(data problems) 
 
Palau 
American Samoa 
Mayotte 
Cuba 
Fiji 
Sint Maarten 
St. Martin 
Curaçao 
Libya* (2011 and 2012 
years) 
 
 
 
